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ABSTRACT
Despite the international recognition of religious freedom as a
fundamental human right, recent developments in the United States and
Europe reveal that the Islamic faith has been singled out qua Islam for
special prohibitions. The question is whether this sectarian approach is
compatible with the normative liberal approach to religious freedom
that emphasizes egalitarianism and neutrality. The answer to this
question is, no. Although religion within the paradigm of liberal
political philosophy does not warrant special legal protection qua
religion, this article contends that it is equally troublesome to single out
religion qua religion for special disfavored treatment, even if the
justification is facially neutral. This article uses facially neutral
examples, such as: the French burqa-ban case, the Travel Ban project
of President Trump, and the anti-Sharia debacle in the state of
Oklahoma. This article draws on the dichotomous approach of liberal
political philosophy to religion and develops a non-sectarian framework
of arguments to defend religious liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2018, the Austrian government decided in an
unprecedented step to close seven mosques and expel dozens of
imams. 1 The closure was based on the 2015 “Islam-bill” that singles
out Islamic organizations for a special ban: the prohibition on receiving
foreign funding. 2 The government reasoned the closure would protect
1. Tom Barnes, Austria to close seven mosques and deport imams in crackdown
(June
8,
2018),
on
‘political
Islam’,
INDEPENDENT
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/austria-close-mosques-expelimams-crackdown-55742091.
2. Section 6. (2) of the Austrian Islam Bill prohibits Islamic Organizations from
accepting foreign funding: “The procurement of funds for the usual activity to satisfy
religious needs of [the] members [of the Islamic Religious Society] has to be
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diversity by standing against the spread of political Islam and thus
prevent radicalization and the creation of parallel societies in Austria.3
At the same time, regarding the same issue, and by reference to the same
concerns, an overwhelming majority of the Dutch Tweede Kamer
(House of Representatives) has urged the government to intensely
monitor the sources of funding for Dutch mosques. 4 The majoritarian
concern is that foreign money has been used as a tool to create support
for a message opposing the dominant standards of the Dutch society.
Under the guise of combatting the “undesirable influence” from “unfree
states,” the Tweede Kamer adopted eight resolutions. 5 These
resolutions varied from the call for a new study about the financial
sources of Dutch mosques to the ban on government subsidies for
Islamic organizations that disturb the integration process of
immigrants. 6 The European concern about the unwanted influences
from the “unfree states,” referring to states in the Gulf region, has also
manifested itself in another way. In the aftermath of the theoterrorist
attacks, meaning terrorism justified on religious grounds, 7 and in

undertaken inland by the Religious Society, the local communities respectively their
members.” Islamgesetz 2015, StF: BGBl. I Nr. 39/2015 (Austria), translated in:
Federal Law on the External Legal Relationships of Islamic Societies – Islam Law
2015
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/
Islamgesetz/Islam_Law.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
3. Nadine Schmidt & Judith Vonberg, Austria to close seven mosques, expel
imams, CNN (June 8, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/08/europe/austriamosques-imams-intl/index.html.
4. See Agenda Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017–2018,
ag-tk-2018-06-01, nr. 11, at 3 (Neth.) (discussing the amount of resolutions submitted
during the parliamentary debate about the funding of mosques in the Netherlands).
5. Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Sjoerdsma/Segers);
Kamerstukken II 2017/18, 29 614, nr. 82 (resolution Becker/Segers) (Neth.) (on file
with author); see generally Tamar de Waal, “Make Sure You Belong!” A Critical
Assessment of Integration Requirements for Residential and Citizenship Rights in
Europe, 25 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author)
(discussing the “integration debate” in Europe).
6. Id
7.
See Paul B. Cliteur, Tolerantie en Theoterrorisme [Tolerance and
Theoterrorism], in FRANS KRAP & WILLEM SINNINGHE DAMSTE (EDS.), OVER
TOLERANTIE GESPROKEN [SPEAKING OF TOLERANCE] 167-69 (2016); see also Paul
Cliteur, BARDOT, FALLACI, HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS [BARDOT, FALLACI,
HOUELLEBECQ EN WILDERS] 2016 (on file with author); Donna E. Arzi, The Role of
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reaction to the political developments in the Middle-East, 8 some
European authorities decided to critically scrutinize the work of Islamic
preachers. 9 A minimally noticed and criticized instrument that is
widely used in this context concerns the policy of targeting a particular
category of Islamic preachers for special restrictions. 10 This category
of religious leaders is usually accused of spreading messages of hatred
and violence. 11 This approach of targeting Islamic extremism manifests
itself in multiple ways and on different levels. As such, on the level of
public and political debate, the language used to address Muslim
radicalization is quite aggressive in tone. 12 The concepts of “hate
Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 15 (2002) (exploring the content of Islamic dogmas, such as Jihad and apostasy).
8. See KARIN VEEGENS, A DISRUPTED BALANCE? (2011) (discussing the
criminal law developments in reaction to terrorist attacks under the flag of religion);
see also Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249 (2006).
9. Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651
(2017) (discussing the debate in the U.S.); Michiel Bot, The Right to Offend:
Contested Speech Acts and Critical Democratic Practice, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 232,
238 (2012) (paying attention to the Dutch debate on reducing the influence of radical
Imams).
10. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of
Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733 (2017) (providing some insights in
the background of targeting Muslims in the U.S.); Jeroen Temperman, Freedom of
Expression and Religious Sensitivities in Pluralist Societies: Facing the Challenge of
Extreme Speech, 2011 BYU L. REV. 729 (2011) (discussing the challenges of religious
sensitivity to free speech and how this right to free expression has been affected by
those sensitives); see also Robin Edger, Are Hate Speech Provisions AntiDemocratic: An International Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 119 (2010)
(assessing the Canadian attempts to deal with “hate speeches” from an international
law perspective); Helen Ginger Berrigan, “Speaking Out” about Hate Speech, 48
LOY. L. REV. 1 (2002) (defining hate speech).
11. This article does not aim to challenge the positive obligation states have
under international law to protect minorities from hate speech. However, it aims to
create awareness about framing the followers of one particular religious faith as
potential terrorists and thus singling out that religion for special bans. See Nazila
Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred: Protections and Implications, 17 INT’L J. ON
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 423, 425 (2010); Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the
Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 253 (2010) (discussing the clash between free speech and religious
freedom).
12. The anti-radicalization policies developed in this regard fit the propagated
idea of tolerating only those versions of the Islam that fit European values. See
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Imams” and “hate preachers” seem to be completely integrated in this
debate. 13 On the level of anti-radicalization policies, the instruments
addressing Muslim-extremism appear to be as severe as the tone of the
anti-radicalization debate. These policies include the following: (1)
indefinitely and “without delay” shutting down mosques and Islamic
institutes; 14 (2) frustrating the broadcast of TV channels; 15 (3) explicit
refusal of permissions to build mosques; 16 (4) withdrawal of residence
permits; 17 (5) imposition of area bans; 18 (6) invalidating issued travel
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM recommendation 15 (2018).
13. See Beydoun, supra note 10 (critiquing this development in the U.S.
context).
14. Cf. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (explicitly calling upon its
member-states to close “without delay” mosques and other Islamic institutes that
violate EU values); Susanne Schröter, Debating Salafism, Traditionalism and
Liberalism: Muslims and the State in Germany, in MOHA ENNAJI (ED.) NEW
HORIZONS OF MUSLIM DIASPORA IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 215 (2016) (on
file with author); see also Harriet Agerholm, Muslims stage mass prayer in protest
over closure of mosques in Italy, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslims-stage-mass-prayerprotest-over-closure-mosques-italy-rome-demonstration-islamophobiaa7376286.html (reporting that Italian authorities have closed mosques on remarkable
“administrative grounds” and highlighting that politicians have expressed their
concerns about the existence of unofficial “garage mosques”).
15. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12 (without providing a clear
definition of “hate preacher,” the European Parliament urges the committee in its draft
report to take legislative steps meant to measure the effectiveness of knocking down
foreign TV channels spreading messages contrary to EU values).
16. Cf. Giorgio Ghiglione in Sesto San Giovann, The fall of ‘Italy’s Stalingrad’:
symbol of left wages war on migrants and poor, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/22/fall-italy-stalingrad-sesto-sangiovanni-milan-symbol-of-the-left-wages-war-on-migrants-and-the-poor (reporting
on how the presence of a terrorist in a small Italian town unfairly played a role in not
granting construction permission for the building of a mosque).
17. Cf. Human Rights Without Frontiers, Belgian court decision blocking
deportation of Brussels grand mosque imam appealed to the council of state, (Nov.
30, 2017), http://hrwf.eu/belgian-court-decision-blocking-deportation-of-brusselsgrand-mosque-imam-appealed-to-the-council-of-state/ (paying attention to the highly
controversial deportation case of the Egyptian imam Abdelhadi Sewif who lived for
13 years in Belgium and was accused of spreading radicalism. Eventually, a Belgium
court stopped the deportation process).
18. The Dutch Raad van State, Council of State May 30, 2018, no.
201709324/1/A3, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:1763 (Neth.) (ruling that the imposed area ban
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visas to attend conferences and symposia; 19 and (7) proposals aimed at
amending criminal law enforcing the law against the “hate Imams” and
takfiri Islamists, 20 who label other Muslims as apostates. 21

on a Muslim preacher was justified in light of the risk of radicalizing believers in those
particular neighborhoods of The Hague, leaving aside the argument of the preacher
that he is manifesting his religion).
19. See Teis Jensen, Denmark bans six ‘hate preachers’ from entering the
country, REUTERS (May 2, 2017), https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idCAKBN17Y1MV-OCATP (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); see also
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/stichting-verbijsterd-over-intrekkingvisa-imams (in 2015 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs invalidated the issued
travel visas of three controversial Islamic preachers that aimed to attend a money
raising “gala” in the Dutch city of Rijswijk); cf. Regional Court of Oost-Brabant
December 23, 2015, no. SHE 15/6861, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2015:7607 (Neth.) (the
mayor of Eindhoven banned the organizers of an Islamic conference); see also
Regional Court of Oost-Brabant January 30, 2017, no. SHE 16/2650,
ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2017:415 (Neth.) (the court overturned the 2015 interim judgment
and ruled that the ban was an inadmissible violation of the right to religious freedom
and the freedom of association).
20. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives],
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II] 2017/2018, at 68-35-12
(Neth.) (showcasing a recent debate in the Netherlands). Amending criminal law for
this purpose is highly controversial. The liberal criticism is of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a
former member of the Dutch House of Representatives, saying that according to our
modern standards, the Islamic Prophet is a warlord. If he is allowed to say this then
why should a local conservative imam not be left room for saying that the mayor of
Rotterdam is an apostate, however shocking and objectionable the content of both
statements may be. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1292 (1994) (arguing that it would be
“unacceptable” from a normative point of view to give a different treatment to very
similar cases).
21. Eli Alshech, The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihado Ranks and the
Emergence of Neo-Takfirism, 21 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 419, 437 (2014) (explaining
what the takfiri ideology entails and providing an overview of the recent
developments regarding the thinking of this sect).
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These recent developments have two key commonalities. First, a
latent presence of Islamophobia, 22 a kind of Islam and Muslim fear.23
As highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion in Trump
v. Hawaii, 24 this fear is gradually growing and institutionalizing.
Second, the deep commitment to undo beliefs, expressions, and
manifestations that deviate from the required and dominant standards
to save mainstream culture fuels the façade of the anti-terrorism and
anti-radicalization agenda. One example of attempting to preserve
mainstream culture is highlighted in the case of Awad v. Ziriax, which
was brought before the Court in the aftermath of the so-called “Save
Our State” Amendment. 25
22. Sohail Wahedi, EU wil islam anders behandelen [EU wants to treat Islam
differently], ND (July 31, 2018), https://www.nd.nl/nieuws/opinie/eu-wil-islamanders-behandelen.3082450.lynkx (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (defining Islamophobia
as fear for the Islam and Muslims and warning for the institutionalization of
Islamophobia); see also ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ, EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA
REPORT 2017 (2018); cf. Yaseen Eldik & Monica C. Bell, The Establishment Clause
and Public Education in an Islamophobic Era, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245 (2012).
23. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the
European Court of Human Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 88 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (analyzing the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in religious freedom cases and
claiming that the Court interprets pluralism as a value that is threatened by the Islamic
faith and needs therefore be protected).
24. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, S.,
dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor criticizes the contentious “Travel Ban” that was
designed and enforced just shortly after President Donald J. Trump came to power.
She notes the Supreme Court’s majority fails to see that the travel ban is a violation
of religious neutrality and a clear sign of Muslim fear. Sotomayor says that
“repackaging” the ban as a security need, knowing that its background is laid down in
the electoral promise of shutting down the U.S. borders for Muslims, “does little to
cleanse [the Travel Ban] of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s
words have created. Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus . . . The
majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and
turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the [Travel Ban] inflicts upon countless
families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.”).
25. See Brenna Bhandar, The Ties that Bind Multiculturalism and Secularism
Reconsidered, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 301, 304, 326 (2009) (discussing multiculturalism and
secularism as established dominant political doctrines dealing with diversity.
Bhandar claims that these political theories “reproduce and hold in place a unitary,
sovereign political subjectivity. Despite their ostensible differences as political
ideologies, both multiculturalism and secularism are deployed as techniques to govern
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This strategy of reconciliation 26 touches on diversity and issues
related to diversity, from a biased and dominant majoritarian
perspective. 27 The main aim of this reconciliation strategy is to make
diversity as a concept, “majoritarian-proof.” 28 That is to say, what is
considered to fit the diversity concept passes through the majoritarian
difference.” She concludes by saying that both political theories have in common the
objective “to govern and manage difference that is perceived to violate dominant
norms and values, defined in reference to the Christian cultural heritage of the nation
state.”); see also Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment:
Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from
Constitutional Attack, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 659 (2014); Michael A. Helfand,
Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).
26. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 126 (2014) (Fr.) (the
Court rules that for “democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within
one and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”); see also Kokkinakis v.
Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 33 (1993) (Greece) (the ECtHR
formulated in this first religious freedom judgment the “reconciliation formula,” using
the same language as in S.A.S. v. France); see also Mark Hill, Tensions and Synergies
in Religious Liberty: An Evaluation of the Interrelation of Freedom of Belief with
Other Human Rights; Parallel Equality and Anti-discrimination Provisions;
Enforcement in Competing European Courts; and Mediated Dispute Resolution, 2014
BYU L. REV. 547 (2014) (providing some insights and background in the case law of
the ECtHR on religious freedom).
27. Eoin Daly, Fraternalism as a Limitation on Religious Freedom: The Case
of S.A.S. v. France, 11 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 140, 165 (2016) (criticizing the way
contentious practices of religious minorities have often been approached from an
ethnocentric perspective that has been grounded on majoritarian cultural norms that
provide little room for the habits of cultural and religious minorities); see also Anna
Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood & Ricard Zapata-Barrero, European challenges to
multicultural citizenship. Muslims, secularism and beyond, in ANNA
TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, TARIQ MODOOD & RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO (EDS.),
MULTICULTURALISM, MUSLIMS AND CITIZENSHIP. A EUROPEAN APPROACH 1, 3
(2006) (saying that “there is a widespread perception that Muslims are making
politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon
European states.”).
28. Cf. Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (outlining
her “Afghanistan experience” and claiming: “What I saw in Kabul in 2003 is a
microcosm of what I see is happening across our world today; a world where the
interests of the powerful and the privileged prevail over those of the poor and the
marginalised, and security trumps human rights.”).
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lens of skepticism and beats the criticism of favoritisms toward
religious believers or immigrants. Thus, what diversity should entail is
made dependent upon the desires and wishes of a dominant majority. 29
This idea of making diversity majoritarian-proof has serious
consequences for the true free exercise of fundamental rights (i.e.,
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of
association). The non-sectarian and thus the egalitarian approach to
fundamental rights is threatened. 30 In addition, the reconciliation
strategy involves another highly unpleasant risk.
Specifically, the reconciliation strategy concerns the emergence of
a “Chrisotcracy” and the shifting away from the religion-neutral liberal
democracy. 31 Here, Christocracy does not refer to a theocracy that is
governed by Jesus’ words or following God’s divine revelations in the
Holy Bible. 32 The type of Christocracy emerging here takes the form

29. Cf. Bhandar, supra note 25, at 315 (discussing the British dilemma of how
to deal with religious manifestations of Muslims in the aftermath of theoterrorism and
the rise of radicalism and extremism).
30. The egalitarian interpretation of religion and religious freedom is not
affected by the specific beliefs that form the basis of certain claims for exceptions.
See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, 146 (2013). Another appropriate
example in this context is the local French ban on wearing the so-called Burkini that
covers the whole body except the face, arguing that this piece of clothing is not
“respectful of good morals and of secularism,” completely ignoring similar clothing
worn by non-Muslim women. See Alissa J. Rubin, French ‘Burkini’ Bans Provoke
Backlash as Armed Police Confront Beachgoers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/france-burkini.html; see also
Mohamed Abdelaal, Extreme Secularism vs. Religious Radicalism: The Case of the
French Burkini, 23 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 454 (2017) (discussing the way
French courts have dealt with the legality of the ban on wearing burkini). One of the
sectarian arguments that is used to justify a non-egalitarian application of religious
freedom is laid down in the idea that Christianity stands for peace while Islam is
inherently violent: STAATKUNDIG GEREFORMEERDE PARTIJ (“SGP”) [THE DUTCH
REFORMED POLITICAL PARTY], ISLAM IN NEDERLAND [ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS]
3, 4 (2017), https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/manifest—islam-in nederland/6125 (last
visited Feb. 27, 2019).
31. Wahedi, supra note 22 (raising up the question as to whether liberal
democracies are moving toward a regime that is democratic for the “native” majority
and “reactionary” in its approach toward the minorities’ claims for exemptions from
general laws).
32. Cf. Erik J. Krueger, God versus Government: Understanding State
Authority in the Context of the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV.
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of a democracy for the “natives,” which consists of a Christian majority
who have full access to the basic liberties. 33 However, this privilege is
not reserved for religious minorities. 34 The concept of Christocracy is
quite ethnocentric in its response to the claims, manifestations, and
beliefs of other religious minorities. 35 This response is meant to
promote the Christian, and as claimed by some, the Judeo-Christian
heritage of Westerns societies. The proponents of this line consider this
historic heritage the cradle of European civilization that has brought
liberties and prosperity to Western nations. 36
The emergence of the reconciliation strategy, and the rise of
ethnocentrism across Western democracies such as the United States
and Europe, might affect the propagated egalitarian understanding of
religious freedom and the idea of “living together in diversity.” 37 Thus,
235, 237 (2013) (Krueger describes Christocracy as “a community of Christians
governed by Christ through the Church according to the immutable divine law.”).
33. See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4.
34. See generally Najmeh Mahmoudjafari, Religion and Family Law: The
Possibility of Pluralistic Cooperation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2014) (on file
with author) (wondering whether the Muslim community could benefit from the same
privileges of religious arbitration, as this option is for example available for the Jewish
community).
35. Joppke, supra note 23, at 96 (in the religious freedom case law of the
ECtHR, Joppke has discovered “a laxness for Christianity and an unforgiving stance
toward Islam,” which he qualifies as “a double standard at work”); see also Sohail
Wahedi & Renée Kool, De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een
rechtsvergelijkende context [The criminal law approach toward female circumcision:
a comparative law perspective], 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RELIGIE, RECHT EN BELEID [J.
FOR RELIGION, L. AND POL’Y], 51 (2016) (on file with author) (highlighting the
emergence of ethnocentrism in the enforcement of laws against the practice of female
genital mutilation).
36. Yasser Louati, Islamophobia in France. National Report 2017, in ENES
BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2017 225
(2018) (commenting on how French politicians have referred to the Judeo-Christian
background of France to promote their political opinions. Louati says, “[w]hile [some
French politicians] constantly pose as staunch advocates of a repressive laïcité when
speaking of the religious rights of Muslims, they nevertheless invoke religious
freedoms or the “Judeo-Christian roots” of France to justify special arrangements for
their political base.”); see also Leyla Yildirim, Islamophobia in Netherlands. National
Report 2017, in ENES BAYRAKLI & FARID HAFEZ (EDS.), EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA
REPORT 2017 431 (2018) (for similar rhetoric used in the Netherlands).
37. Ilias Trispiotis, Two Interpretations of Living Together in European Human
Rights Law, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 580, 582 (2016) (arguing that “the historical
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where does our analysis bring us in terms of the widely advocated
egalitarian understanding of religious freedom in liberal political
philosophy and the idea of “living together in diversity”? To develop a
robust theoretical framework that helps us reflect on this question, we
should deal with two intertwined matters. On the one hand, we have to
deal with the question of religious freedom and its propagated nonsectarian and egalitarian understanding. On the other, we need to
properly address the rise of ethnocentrism across Western democracies
and the related concerns about the reconciliation strategy. 38
Our analysis begins with the question of whether the move toward
ethnocentrism and the use of a reconciliation strategy reflect the
propagated non-sectarian role religion should play for the purposes of
religious accommodation and decisions taken in liberal democracies.39
To explore more on this matter, we need to take two steps. First, we
need to conceptualize the reconciliation strategy. Second, we need to
provide a clear theoretical framework that helps us find out what role
religion plays, for legal and political purposes, within the paradigm of
liberal political philosophy. A recent draft report of the special
European Parliamentary committee on anti-terrorism provides a
helping hand regarding this first step; the report urges member states to
combat Islamic manifestations that violate European values. 40 The
same is true for the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”). The ECtHR has used the concept of “living together,” as
used in S.A.S. v. France (S.A.S.), ruling that norms prohibiting or
restricting “contentious religious manifestations” do not violate
religious freedom. The Court held that such prohibitions are meant to
protect the rights and freedoms of others through ruling out religious
practices that challenge the core values of a democratic society. 41
Part I of this article draws on relevant case law and the
recommendations of the special committee to theorize the
emphasis on peaceful coexistence” reveals much of the way European authorities deal
with religion).
38. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality and Anarchy, in RELIGION IN
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017)
(explaining the relevant methodology).
39. Cf. CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017); CÉCILE LABORDE &
AURÉLIA BARDON, RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2017).
40. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12.
41. S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 126 (2014).
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reconciliation strategy. Although this theorization rests heavily on
European experiences, a similar development of reinforcing
majoritarianism is happening in the United States. The most recent case
in the United States that illustrates reinforcing majoritarianism is Trump
v. Hawaii. However, the “Travel Ban” preceding this Supreme Court
ruling is not unique in its effect of singling out one faith for a special
ban. The “Save Our State” Amendment in Oklahoma, resulting in
Awad v. Ziriax,42 and the upcoming United States v. Nagarwala,43
contain elements of what this article theorizes as the reinforcement of
majoritarianism that causes feelings of anxiety toward the “stranger.”44
Part II of this article focuses on whether the reconciliation strategy
could be considered a paradigmatic expression of the most recent
theoretical developments regarding the place of religion within liberal
political philosophy. 45 These developments involve a growing support
42. This case concerned the lawfulness of State Question 755 that aimed to ban
the use of Sharia Law in the courts of the state of Oklahoma. Its author, Rex Duncan,
presented his initiative as a necessary mean in the battle against an evil culture. Both
the District Court as well as the Court of Appeals decided that the ban—which was
approved by more than 70% of the Oklahomans participating in the ballot—was
clearly aimed at singling out the Islamic law for a disfavored treatment and for these
reasons both legal instances held that challenger would likely be able to challenge this
ban because it was unconditional and violated the Establishment Clause. Awad v.
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Awad v. Ziriax 670 F.3d 1111 (10th
Cir. 2012); see Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral Anti-Shariah
Bills: A Constitutional Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 31
(2013); Lee Tankle, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself: Islamophobia
and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary Anti-Religion Laws, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273 (2012); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First
Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2012).
43. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (the
legality of female circumcision, which involves separating the mucous membrane
from the genitalia, however the District Court held that the Federal law banning this
practice is unconstitutional because “Congress had no authority to pass this statute
under either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause.” The District
Court referred in this respect to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct.
1624 and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. at 858, 134 S. Ct. 2077. This case is pending
appeal).
44. Trispiotis, supra note 37. Here, “stranger,” means those who do not belong
to an established majority, either because they adhere to another religion or because
they have an immigrant background.
45. Part II includes and revises the analysis on the role of religion in liberal
political philosophy that has been published previously. See Sohail Wahedi,
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for a “religion-empty” and a “God-empty” understanding of religion
and religious freedom. 46
Such understanding draws on nonsectarianism, anti-favoritisms, and thus, an egalitarian approach to the
beliefs, views, expressions, and manifestations of citizens. 47 Part II
helps us understand why religion qua religion does not require special
protection. Thus, each liberal protection provided for the exercise of
religion takes place through finding suitable substitutes for the category
of religion. This means religion is only special because of abstraction.
Allegedly, it is not possible to provide a liberal protection regime for
religion qua religion. 48 This theoretical framework helps us to answer
the question of why majoritarian sensitivities seem to prevail in
important free exercise cases.
As we will see, in S.A.S. v. France, the ban on religious facecovering veils has been justified as a matter of “living together.” 49 The
“Travel Ban” in Trump v. Hawaii was justified as a matter of security. 50
The “Save Our State” Amendment was a serious attempt to keep the
“stranger” 51 outside the territories of the state—a policy of fear that
Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (20172018).
46. See generally Wahedi, supra note 22.
47. Id.
48. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 83 (2014).
49. The French ban on face-covering veils did not violate the right to Religious
Freedom, as France had “a broad margin of appreciation” to make a choice regarding
the lawfulness of face-covering veils.
50. For example, the first version of the travel ban, Executive Order 13769,
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, explicitly
said that
Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and
civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means
possible to enter the United States. The United States must be vigilant
during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission
do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 FR 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
51. Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment, 2017 BYU
L. REV. 779, 825 (2017); Eunice Lee, Non-Discrimination in Refugee and Asylum
Law (Against Travel Ban 1.0 and 2.0), 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2017) (both
saying that the aim—as explicitly mentioned in the first version of the travel ban,
Executive Order 13,769—to keep honor killers outside the United States is an obvious
reference to Muslims).
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advanced the political agenda of spreading anxiety toward the
“stranger.” Another example is United States v. Nagarwala, where the
interventions were based on protecting girls, leaving zero room for
analogies. 52 Moreover, why do authorities allow religious male
circumcision qua religious, 53 while religious and ritual female
circumcision has been outlawed in all its variants? Part II also suggests
that we can understand this way of “re-packaging” religious cases as
“abstraction from the religious dimension,” which does not justify
singling out one faith for special bans in liberal democracies.
Part III draws on the liberal critique of singling out religion qua
religion for special protection in law and the emergence of the
reconciliation strategy. Part III also addresses the shift toward
ethnocentrism to provide a more “close-to-reality” conception of
religious freedom that is “diversity-friendly,” “sectarian-proof,” and
compatible with the egalitarian view of this right that rejects religious
toleration qua religious. 54
This article concludes that although the presence of the
reconciliation strategy and the shift toward ethnocentrism can be
52. Cf. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(outlawing the Federal law on banning female circumcision and saying with reference
to United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) that “as the Supreme Court
found in Morrison, rape and other forms of sexual assault against women are not
economic or commercial activity, and therefore not part of an interstate market, no
different conclusion can be reached concerning FGM, which is another form of
gender-related violence.”).
53. Cf. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. New York City Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (on file with author) (holding
that a local regulation banning the practice of immediate oral suction of the
circumcision wound—also known as metzitzah b’peh and practiced by some
Orthodox Jews—preventing the spread of (Herpes Simplex Virus) is not neutral nor
generally applicable. “The Regulation is not neutral because it purposefully and
exclusively targets a religious practice for special burdens. And . . . the Regulation is
not generally applicable either, because it is underinclusive in relation to its asserted
secular goals: the Regulation pertains to religious conduct associated with a small
percentage of HSV infection cases among infants, while leaving secular conduct
associated with a larger percentage of such infection unaddressed.” In fact, the Court
accepts at this point that ritual male circumcision is a permissible religious practice as
it points out that the Regulation mainly “targets a religious practice for special
burdens.”).
54. Part III includes and revises the analysis on the pragmatic defense of
religious freedom that has been published previously. See Sohail Wahedi, The Health
Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J 209 (2019).
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theorized in light of the abstraction theory, as developed and defended
in this article, we need to be very cautious about this justification. After
all, non-sectarianism and egalitarianism are two sides of the same coin.
This means authorities need to be very careful about disfavoring
harmless, though very different lifestyles that deviate from the desired
standards. This religion-empty understanding of religious freedom
supports the proposition that people should be free to organize and live
their lives as they choose. 55 However, the reconciliation strategy and
the emergence of strong ethnocentrism give cause to rethink religious
freedom in a way that endorses diversity for pragmatic reasons,
intending to avoid a Hobbesian “war of all against all.” 56 Hence, this
defense of religious freedom is rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian,
non-majoritarian, and non-violent toward the advocated egalitarian
conception of religious freedom. 57
I. THE RECONCILIATION STRATEGY
Hidden behind the façade of “unity in diversity” that aims to
combat “radical Islam” and support the moderate Muslim, a special
anti-terrorism committee of the European Parliament has proposed in
its recent report to only tolerate variants of Islam that are “in full
accordance with EU values.” 58 These values include respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms, human dignity, equality, and solidarity. 59
Mosques and other Islamic institutes that violate these values should be
closed immediately. 60 This radical proposal is the first serious and most
comprehensive legislative attempt to create a legal basis for state
interventions against norm deviant beliefs, expressions, and

55. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30 (this idea is grounded in the
neutrality principle of liberal philosophy. The State should act in a religion-blind way.
This positions considers religion a non-sectarian concept that could help people to
organize their lives independently, and thus without State interference, except for
cases of harm or damages).
56. Cf. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 9 (2014).
57. Cf. Sohail Wahedi, Female circumcision as an African problem: double
standards or harsh reality?, in CHRISTIAN GREEN, JEREMY GUNN & MARK HILL
(EDS.), RELIGION, LAW AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 400 (2018).
58. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, 17.
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 17.
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manifestations of a “contentious minority” in Europe. However, it is
not something completely unique. On a different level and in a case by
case assessment, judges across liberal democracies have ruled in a large
number of cases on the legality of religious manifestations that are
considered contrary to legal and social norms of society. 61
The legal outcomes of some of these cases are as controversial as
the proposed plans of the special committee. The controversy lies in
two specific grounds that shape the contours of the reconciliation
strategy. First, some court judgments and the special committee report
seek to adjust beliefs, expressions, and manifestations that violate
general expectations about how one should live a life conforming to the
dominant standards of the society. Second, the court judgments and the
recommendations of the European Parliament seem to single out one
“contentious” minority for special bans and restrictions. At this point,
the majoritarian attitude is that some beliefs, expressions, and
manifestations of this minority are unwelcome, anomalous, or simply
problematic, 62 as they do not show enough respect for the societal
achievements of Western societies, such as the equality between men
and women. 63
Taking both developments together unveils that very little of the
propagated egalitarian and non-sectarian conception of religious

61. Shelby L. Wade, Living Together or Living Apart from Religious
Freedoms: The European Court of Human Right’s Concept of Living Together and
Its Impact on Religious Freedom, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 411 (2018); Sarah
Trotter, Living Together, Learning Together, and Swimming Together: Osmanoglu
and Kocabas v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of Collective Life, 18 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 157, 169 (2018) (discussing the emergence of the “living together”
doctrine in the case law of the ECtHR and how this shift move toward constructing a
“common identity” has affected free exercise of religious freedom); Cf. Stephanie A.
Ferraiolo, Justice for Injured Children: A Look into Possible Criminal Liability of
Parents Whose Unvaccinated Children Infect Others, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 29
(2016); Geurt Henk Spruyt, Politicians and Epidemics in the Bible Belt, 12 UTRECHT
L. REV. 114, 124 (2016) (refraining from child vaccination on religious grounds
provides another appropriate example of a contentious religious manifestation). Cf.
John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
177 (2010).
62. Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, supra note 27, at 3.
63. Cf. Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherands (SGP), App. No.
58369/10, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2012) (critically scrutinizing the practice of a “native”
religious minority).
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freedom has been adopted by decision makers in law and politics across
liberal democracies. 64
Instead, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others has been
prioritized to cut off non-mainstream ways of life. 65 This approach is
clearly present in the ECtHR’s case law concerning the legality of
Islamic dress codes, 66 such as headscarves and face-covering veils.67
The European Parliament’s recent draft report highly relies on the same
ECtHR formula. The rule of thumb is that protecting the rights and
freedoms of “others” justifies state practices that violate a minority’s
rights. 68 Hence, the special committee’s recommendations might sound
radical or even contradictory to the concept of “living together” in peace
and diversity, but it attempts to codify the line that was developed by
the ECtHR. In other words, the recommendations of the special
committee and the ECtHR’s case law share exactly the same narrative
64. Cf. Id. The SGP case is controversial for several reasons. Mainly, the idea
that the State should not interfere in the way people want to give content to their lives,
simply because the authorities do not appreciate that way of life, not because that way
of life is causing harm or puts the safety of others under serious health risks. See
generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, and Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom
to Moral Freedom, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2010) (arguing that the state should
not prescribe how people should live their lives).
65. Cf. interview with the former acting mayor of Amsterdam Jozias van
Aartsen: Niels Klaassen, ‘VVD moet moslims juist beschermen’ [‘VVD must protect
Muslims’], AD (July 20, 2018) (on file with author) (Van Aartsen claims that much
of the current policy is based on gut feelings and suspicion toward Muslims, while
religious freedom is meant to stop the government from prescribing how one should
exercise his religion).
66. The ECtHR judgment in the SGP case forms an exception to this view.
Another exception to this rule is the court judgment in Refah Partisi and Others v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2003)
(in both judgments the major concern was the rights and freedoms of others).
67. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001)
[hereinafter, Dahlab v. Switzerland]; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur.
Ct. H. R. (2005) [hereinafter Leyla Şahin v. Turkey]. See also Timothy J. Murphy,
Comparative Secularism: Leaving Room for the Holy Spirit and Headscarves in
Turkish and American Public Schools, 45 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 297 (2015) (providing a
comparative critical analysis of the protection regime for religion in the United States
and Turkey).
68. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12; see also Trotter supra note 61, at
163 (analyzes and discusses the way the ECtHR has embraced through case law the
doctrine of “living together” as part of the limitation ground “protecting the rights and
freedoms of others” to justify restrictions upon religious freedom).
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that, in turn, reconciles diversity with majoritarian sensitivities about
the way people should live their lives. What does this narrative exactly
entail and how does it help us to theorize the reconciliation strategy?
To answer this question, we can make use of the court’s ruling in S.A.S.
and compare this decision to the special committee’s recommendations.
A. S.A.S. v. France
In S.A.S., the ECtHR used, for the first time, the predominantly
French concept of “living together” to rule on the legality of the French
ban on publicly wearing face-covering veils. 69 The background of this
judgment lies in the adoption of a highly controversial bill that aimed
to ban face-covering dresses and veils, such as the burqa and niqab.70
In July 2010, the French Assemblée Nationale passed the bill that was
meant to prohibit concealing one’s face in the public space. An absolute
majority of the then present Assembly members voted in favor of this
bill. Only one member voted against it while three members
abstained. 71 In September 2010, the French Sénat adopted by an
absolute majority the bill that criminalized wearing face-covering
dresses in public (“prohibition law”). 72

69. Hakeem Yusuf, S.A.S. v. France: Supporting Living Together or Forced
Assimilation, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 277, 281 (2014) (criticizing the embracement
of the French “living together” doctrine in S.A.S.).
70. LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du
visage dans l’espace public (LOI n° 2010-1192) [Law no. 2010-1192 of October 11,
2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in the public space] (Fran.).
71. See generally Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. – No 72 [2] A.N. (C.R.), –
2e SÉANCE DU 13 JUILLET 2010, 5550 (Fran.) (on file with author) (335 out of 339
present Assembly members voted in favor of the bill).
72. Sénat, Année 2010. – No 82 S. (C.R.), SÉANCE DU 14 SEPTEMBRE 2010,
6763 (Fran.) (246 out of 247 present Senate members voted in favor of the bill. One
member voted against).
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1. The French Prohibition Law
The French prohibition law, which has been active since April
2011, 73 prohibits anyone from covering his or her face in public,74
unless this face concealment is required: (1) to fulfil a legal duty, (2)
for a festivity, traditional, or artistic event, or (3) for the exercise of a
particular sport. 75 An individual who violates this prohibition is fined
or obligated to take a course on citizenship, or a combination of both.76
The parliamentary proceedings on this bill reveal that the main rationale
behind this piece of legislation has been the complete withdrawal of the
Islamic face-covering dresses, such as the burqa and niqab from the
public space in France. 77 The main justification for this intervention
has been enshrined in the French idea of “living together” that has
allegedly been threatened and frustrated by face-covering dresses. 78
73. See generally S.A.S. v. France, ¶¶ 14; 24-27 (providing a chronological
overview of the legislative steps set to criminalize the concealment of the face in
public).
74. LOI n° 2010-1192, (Article 1: No one may, within the public space, wear
clothing that conceals the face.) See also S.A.S. v. France, ¶ 28 (provides a translation
of the French Law on face-covering veils).
75. LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 2, section II.
76. LOI n° 2010-1192, Article 3 (the amount of this fine is connected with the
infringements of second class).
77. See Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do;jsessionid=A3D47BAB744505
C3074B405E1EA232DA.tplgfr25s_3?idDocument=JORFDOLE000022234691&ty
pe=expose&typeLoi=&legislature= (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (according to this
document that explains the rationale behind the bill, the French values of liberty,
equality and fraternity, which “underpin the principle of respect for . . . equality
between men and women” are threatened “by the wearing of full veil”). The
quotations are based on the translation of the Expose des Motifs in S.A.S. v. France,
¶ 25. Also, the debates in the French Parliament reveals that the main aim of this
prohibition has been the Islamic face-covering veils, like burqa and niqab. As such,
only during the three debate at the Assemblée nationale, these contentious pieces of
clothes are mentioned 92 times.
78. Expose des Motifs, Explanatory Memorandum of LOI n° 2010-1192, supra
note 77 (the main argument behind this bill has always been that face-covering dresses
are incompatible with the idea of “living together.” The Memorandum does not
explicate what this concept entails. However, it says that the French Republic is based
on certain values, such as liberty, equality and fraternity and also some principles, like
gender equality, which are threatened by a “sectarian manifestation” that rejects the
values of the French Republic. Hence, the Memorandum suggests that “the
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The bill’s historical background is essential to better understand the
rationale behind the bill. 79 The bill’s historical background unveils that
the concept of “living together” is basically defined by an exclusive
French Republican ideal about how citizens should live and behave
within the Republic, 80 providing little room for groups or people who
reject this view. 81 Furthermore, this domestic background helps us
evaluate the implications of adopting the ECtHR’s “living together”
doctrine and its impact on the free exercise of religion and matters of
diversity that are so closely related to this right. 82
2. The French Prohibition Law Before the European Court
of Human Rights
In S.A.S., a French citizen who was born in Pakistan but living in
France, challenged the prohibition law. 83 She described herself as a
“devout Muslim.” 84 In her public and private life, she occasionally

Republican social covenant” that forms the basis of the French society needs to be
protected through outlawing practices that are contrary to this). See also S.A.S. v.
France, ¶¶ 25, 140-41. This call can also be found back in the Parliamentary debate
concerning the bill. Cf. the position of André Gerin who has defended the prohibition,
since “the burqa, is the refusal of the Republic”: Assemblée nationale, Année 2010. –
No 70 [1] A.N. (C.R.), – 1re SÉANCE DU 7 JUILLET 2010, 5394 (Fran.) (on file with
author).
79. Daly, supra note 27, at 141 (arguing that “living together,” which has
played such an important role in the justification of the prohibition, is a French
concept about the manners of behavior in public life, in other words, it concerns “the
duty of fraternity”).
80. This line of reasoning is echoed very well by the contribution of JeanClaude Guibal, who was a member of the Union pour un mouvement populaire
[Union for a Popular Movement] that was led by Nicolas Sarkozy. During his address
of the bill at the Assemblée nationale, Guibal defended the proposed prohibition and
argued that although France is a tolerant society, it does not accept that some groups
refuse to live in France as French people. Guibal said that such groups threatened
“our” way of “living together” by their provocative behavior.
81. Daly, supra note 27, at 146-47 (criticizing the Court judgment in S.A.S.).
This point of criticism was also mentioned by the applicant who challenged the French
prohibition law before the ECtHR. See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77.
82. See Trotter, supra note 61.
83. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76.
84. Id. ¶ 11.
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covered her face for religious, cultural, and personal purposes. 85 In
doing so, she did not experience any forces or threats from her family
or her husband to cover her face. 86 If needed, she refrained from using
her face-covering niqab or burqa. 87 However, she insisted on having
the option to cover her face when she was in a particular spiritual mood,
such as during the Islamic fasting period. 88
Although she was not prosecuted for a breach of the new
prohibition law nor did she experience any negative consequence
immediately after the enactment of the prohibition law, 89 she aimed to
challenge the legality of this law for different reasons. 90 However, for
the purpose of theorizing the reconciliation strategy, we will only focus
on the alleged violation of religious freedom and the way the ECtHR
has dealt with this particular concern. 91 The complaint about the
violation of religious freedom rested strictly on two arguments. 92 The
first argument suggested that although the ban on wearing facecovering dresses was prescribed by law, 93 it generally lacked
resemblance to any of the legitimate limitation grounds against the free
exercise of religion. 94 Moreover, the criticism put the defense of the
French style of “living together” in the public area under critical

85. Id. ¶ 12.
86. Id. ¶ 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 12.
89. Id. ¶ 57.
90. Id. ¶¶ 69-73 (she argued before the Court that the French prohibition law
put her at risk of harassment. Furthermore, she claimed that the ban discriminated
against her and violated her freedoms of expression, association, and respect for the
private life).
91. See id. ¶¶ 76-80 (arguing why the ban violated her right to religious
freedom and respect for the private life). See id. ¶¶ 110-158 (the Court’s assessment
of the complaint regarding the alleged violation of religious freedom and the right to
respect the private life).
92. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter,
ECHR].
93. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 76.
94. Id. ¶ 77 (the applicant argues why the prohibition law cannot pursue the
legitimate limitation ground of “public safety,” since the ban was not designed for
security reasons).
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scrutiny. 95 The argument was that this French justification for the
prohibition law completely neglected the minority’s perspective. This
particular viewpoint rested on the idea that it is possible for minorities
to peacefully live together with the majority, while keeping their own
habits and traditions. 96 In other words, living peacefully does not
require the minority group to strictly follow the French style of “living
together.” 97 In the same way, presenting the law as a tool to pursue
gender equality was considered a “simplistic” presentation of the reality
in which there are groups of women who themselves choose to cover
their faces. 98
The second argument that questioned the legality of the prohibition
law challenged the “necessity” of this ban in light of the prohibition
law’s justification. 99 The criticism, at this point, contended that it is not
95. See Assemblée nationale, supra note 71, at 5548 (on file with author). The
original text of this address reads as follows:
“[L]e port du voile intégral constitue bien une pratique aux antipodes des
valeurs qui fondent et structurent l’idée que tous ici nous nous faisons de la
République. C’est un déni de liberté lorsqu’il a lieu sous l’effet de la
contrainte, que celle-ci soit patente ou diluée dans un environnement social
; c’est une négation de l’égalité entre citoyens qui dépouille la femme de
son identité, quand ce n’est pas de son humanité ; c’est un refus affiché de
l’idéal de fraternité, une volonté de se soustraire au vivre ensemble
républicain.”
96. See S.A.S. v. France ¶ 77.
97. Id. ¶ 77 in conjunction with ¶ 114.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 111. The ECtHR follows four specific steps to decide upon an alleged
violation of the right to respect: private and family life; the freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion; and freedom of expression, assembly, and association. First,
it decides upon the presence of an interference. Second, it rules on the question as to
whether this interference was prescribed by law. Third, it answers the question
whether this interference was meant to pursue one or more of legitimate limitation
grounds upon fundamental freedoms. Finally, it considers whether such a legitimate
interference is necessary in a democratic society. The necessity question is a
proportionality test. In fact, it helps judges determine whether a particular limitation
upon a fundamental right “is necessary in a democratic society” to meet one or more
of the legitimate limitation grounds, such as public safety, health, or morals, and the
protection of public order as well as the rights and freedoms of others. Although the
Court does not want to frustrate the democratic decisions of national states that in
some cases limit the exercise of fundamental freedoms, giving states a certain “margin
of appreciation” to take decisions, it aims to consider whether there is a “pressing
social need” for a specific limitation. That pressing social need is meant to determine
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to the authorities to favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle. Thus, the
critique was about state’s interferences in how people want to live their
individual lives. 100 More generally, the argument suggested that a free
society should accommodate a wide range of people, both believers and
non-believers. 101 Hence, the authorities should not single out a
particular lifestyle for disfavored treatment, even if there might be
political support for that purpose. In other words, political support for
a limitation does not automatically say that the measure is “necessary
in a democratic society.” 102 The argument relied on the idea that French
authorities have failed to study less restrictive measures that could have
reached the same goals as the ones behind the prohibition law. 103
3. The Court’s Assessment of the Legality of the French
Prohibition Law
In the Court’s assessment of the alleged violation of the right to
religious freedom, it first rules that the French prohibition law interferes
with the right to free exercise of religion. 104 Subsequently, the Court
considers this “continuing interference” as sufficiently prescribed by

the limitation’s necessity. See generally Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin or
Appreciation, 3 UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 9 (2010); Gerorge Letsas, Two Concepts of
the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 710-11 (2006)
(analyzing how the ECtHR assesses complaints about alleged violation of
fundamental rights). See also Christopher Belelieu, The Headscarf as a Symbolic
Enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing
Islam through a European Legal Prism in Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 573, 590 (2006); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 128 (2005) (providing a historical overview of the way the
margin of appreciation doctrine has been developed in the case law of the ECtHR and
discussing the way the Court has dealt with the “necessity test”).
100. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (arguing that a liberal state
should not favor or disfavor a particular lifestyle because another lifestyle is
“intrinsically better.” It should be left to citizens to decide which way of life better
suits them).
103. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 78.
104. Id. ¶¶ 110-112.
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law. 105 The Court elaborates quite extensively on the question of
whether the French prohibition law pursues a legitimate aim. 106 The
same is true for the legal assessment of the necessity test, which asks:
is the prohibition law necessary in a democratic society to pursue one
or more of the legitimate limitation grounds? 107
What does the Court say about the legitimacy of the aim behind the
prohibition law? The Court starts by noting that the list of grounds on
which states could rely on to justify interferences with fundamental
rights is “exhaustive” and their definition is “restrictive.” 108 Meaning,
the Court refrains from applying an extensive interpretation method to
interpret the limitation grounds in light of an alleged violation of
fundamental rights. 109
In order to rule on whether there is a legitimate ground for the
prohibition law, the Court draws on the justification provided by the
French authorities in favor of the law. 110 The authorities have argued
the ban pursues two goals. First, it aims to protect public safety.111
Second, it aims to enforce respect for the minimum set of values of an
open and democratic society. 112 The Court concludes that the latter aim
does not “expressly” correspond with any of the legitimate limitations
grounds that are mentioned in the Convention.113 Absent a Convention
limitation ground, the Court specifies with reference to the explanation
provided by the French authorities that the second aim behind the
prohibition law is meant to serve three values. 114 The three values are:
(1) pursing respect for gender equality, (2) pursuing respect for human
dignity, and (3) pursing respect for the minimum requirements of life
in society. 115

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 113-122.
Id. ¶¶ 123-159.
Id. ¶ 113.
Id.
Id. ¶ 110-11
Id. ¶ 114-115.
Id. ¶ 114.
Id.
Id. ¶ 116.
Id.
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At first sight, the Court says that pursuing these three values cannot
be related to one of the legitimate limitations grounds that are enlisted
in the ECHR. 116
Nevertheless, the Court relies on the French government’s
argument, which suggests ensuring respect for the minimum set of
values of an open and democratic society as part of the legitimate
limitation ground of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. 117 In
doing so, the Court first examines and rejects the gender-equality
argument.
According to the Court, this gender argument is ill-founded to
pursue protection of the rights and freedoms of others as ultimate
justification for the prohibition law. 118 In this context, the Court refers
to women who insist to wear this type of clothing in public for religious
purpose and as a matter of personal choice. 119 In other words, the treaty
does not allow the limiting of people’s basic liberties by an appeal to
protecting these people from the free exercise of fundamental rights. 120

116. Id. ¶ 117.
117. Id.; Id. ¶¶ 81-82.
118. Id. ¶ 119. The court’s rejection of the gender argument is a shift away
from its own jurisprudence in which the Court repeatedly showed leniency toward the
gender argument, allowing far reaching restrictions upon free exercise of religion and
targeting particularly women. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1094 (2009); Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human
Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s
Equality under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 382 (2007);
Benjamin Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of
Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Sahin v.
Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2005). Interestingly enough, the Government’s
gender argument in favor of the ban was later debunked by empirical findings. See
Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance
of Empirical Findings, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 517, 551 (2014) (purporting that some of
women who cover their faces “express assertive emancipated views against traditional
role patterns and against unequal gender practices in the Muslim community,”
concluding that “the face veil is not an indicator of its wearer’s approval of male
dominance, let alone of its promotion.”).
119. Id. ¶ 125.
120. Id. ¶ 119 (the Court held: “a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in
order to ban a practice that is defended by women . . . in the context of the exercise of
the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that
individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own
fundamental rights and freedoms.”).
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With regard to the argument that the prohibition law aims to pursue
respect for human dignity, this noble ground does not justify “a blanket
ban” on face-covering dresses in public, despite the fact that this piece
of clothing is considered “strange” by many people in the society. 121
The argument is that this “expression of a cultural identity” is crucial
for the maintenance of pluralism, 122 which is according to the Court in
favor of the whole democracy. 123
When it comes to the assessment of the third value, respect for the
minimum requirements of life in society (that is synonymous to “living
together”), the Court very briefly says that pursuing this value might
fall under the scope of the legitimate limitation ground of protecting the
rights and freedoms of others. 124 In this regard, the Court engages with
the French position—that considers an unveiled face in public as an
indispensable tool for social interaction. 125 The Court reaches the
following conclusion:
It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places
open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there
which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of open
interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established
consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within
the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived
by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space
of socialisation which makes living together easier. That being said, in
view of the flexibility of the notion of “living together” and the resulting
risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the
necessity of the impugned limitation.126
After having concluded that the French prohibition law constitutes
an interference, which is prescribed by law and also pursues a legitimate
aim, the Court starts examining the necessity of the legitimate limitation

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. ¶ 120.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id.
Id.
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in a democratic society. 127 In this regard, the Court first reiterates its
standard interpretation of religious freedom, noting that:
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the
Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists,
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the
centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to
hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise
a religion. 128

However, the Court has also ruled that limitations upon free
exercise of religious freedom are at some points justified as a tool “to
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s
beliefs are respected.” 129 This asks judges to “balance between the
fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation
of a ‘democratic society.’” 130 This judicial balance should not frustrate
the decision making process that has democratic legitimacy. The Court
admits at this point that it has a “subsidiary role” in assessing whether
particular restrictions upon fundamental rights in democratic societies
are necessary. 131 This is because the Court views the sovereign states
are “in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate
local needs and conditions.” 132
127. Id. ¶ 124.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 126.
130. Id. ¶ 128.
131. Id. ¶ 129.
132. Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99 (for more information on “the better placed
argument”). See also Patricia Popelier & Catherine van de Heyning, Subsidiarity
Post-Brighton: Procedural Rationality as Answer, 30 LJIL 5 (2017) (analyzing how
the ECtHR has dealt with the principle of subsidiarity, comparing the period before
and after the so-called “Brighton” declaration that aimed to reinforce the idea that
national States are in a better position to deal with the proper protection of
fundamental rights); Alastair Mowbray, Subsidiarity and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313 (2015) (using a quantitative research
method to analyze the subsidiarity principle); Matthew Saul, The European Court of
Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments,
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This is especially the case, the Court found, when it faces questions
of law and religion. 133 Hence, the Court ruled that in such cases, “the
role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”134
In such cases, the Court grants states a wider “margin of
appreciation,” 135 in assessing whether the legitimate limitation upon a
particular freedom can undergo the necessity test. 136 To examine this
properly, the Court must determine whether there is “consensus”
amongst the member states of the ECHR concerning the need to impose
certain limitations upon the exercise of a freedom. 137 This margin of
appreciation does not provide states a carte blanche, rather it “goes
hand in hand with a European supervision embracing both the law and
the decisions applying it. The Court’s task is to determine whether the

15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 745, 751 (2015) (providing an explanation for the subsidiarity
principle, referring to the democratic legitimacy of nation Sates, the state of art with
regard to a particular limitation amongst the States and the domestic expertise that an
international Court generally lacks).
133. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129.
134. Id. ¶ 129. See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Michael A. Helfand, The
Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 1051, 1052 (2013) (on the continuous and “endless jousting” between law and
religion).
135. In short, this doctrine entails that the Court grants the State certain room
to develop its own policies. That room—the margin of appreciation—might be wider
(i.e., the Court is less restrictive) in cases concerning subjects that state parties are
“better placed” to deal with or issues where state parties respond differently to, the
so-called “no-consensus” argument.
136. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 129; see also Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience,
and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
807, 824 (2016).
137. Id.; see Brauch, supra note 99, at 126-27 (identifying two key-factors that
help to define the scope of the margin of appreciation: “[first,] a balancing of the
importance of the right with the importance of the restriction, [second] the existence
of a European consensus on the matter before the Court.”); Peter Cumper & Tom
Lewis, Empathy and Human Rights: The Case of Religious Dress, 18 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 61, 69 (2018) (arguing that consensus amongst the member States generally
leads to a narrower margin of appreciation). Cf. Ryan Thoreson, The Limits of Moral
Limitations: Reconceptualizing Morals in Human Rights Law, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J.
197, 217 (2018) (giving the example of restrictions and limitations upon adult samesex activities and illustrating how growing consensus amongst member States led to
a narrower margin of appreciation in finding justification for such limitations).
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measures taken at national level were justified in principle and
proportionate.” 138
In addition to the analysis above, the Court also examined the
necessity of the ban in light of the public safety argument. 139 In a more
general note, the Court found that restrictions upon religious freedom
for security reasons are, under some circumstances, necessary in a
democratic society. 140 However, the Court did not see any reason to
consider the prohibition law as a legitimate limitation that aims to deal
with an immediate security threat. 141 For instance, the Court considered
that the authorities could have chosen a less restrictive measure, such
as requiring women to take off their veils at places that are constantly
under high pressure of security threats. 142 Hence, the Court ruled that
the interference caused by the prohibition law cannot be justified in a
democratic society on the ground of pursuing public safety. 143
The Court then assessed the necessity of the French prohibition law
in light of the second justification provided by the authorities:
considering the ban as ensuring the “living together” ideal. 144 Against
the backdrop of the weight French authorities have given to ensure a
particular way of “living together,” the Court was sensitive to the
argument that states should be given room “to secure the conditions
whereby individuals can live together in their diversity.” 145 Hence, the
138. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 131. See Letsas, supra note 99, at 711 (claiming that
the proportionality question “is by far the most important and most demanding
criterion for whether the limitation of a right was permissible under the Convention.”).
Cf. Rosamund Scott, Reproductive Health: Morals, Margins and Rights, 81 MOD. L.
REV. 422, 425 (2018) (arguing that the proportionality test “underlies the assessment
of necessity and the Convention as a whole,” which in turn requires a proper
assessment “between the interests and rights of the individual and those of the
community, including the public interest.”).
139. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 137 (rejecting first the claim that the prohibition law
was meant “to protect women against a practice which was imposed on them or would
be detrimental to them.”).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 140 (the value of respect for the minimum requirements of life in
society is amongst the three values of the broader goal pursuing respect for the
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society).
145. Id. ¶ 141.
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Court found the interference upon religious freedom “justified in its
principle solely” because it aims to shape the contours of “living
together” in the French society. 146
With regard to the democratic necessity of imposing a ban on
wearing face-covering veils in public that aims to ensure “living
together,” the Court admitted that this ban might “seem excessive,”
because it is designed to target a very small group who wants to cover
their face in public. 147 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it is
aware of the fact that:
[T]he ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of
women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil
for reasons related to their beliefs. As stated previously, they are thus
confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect
of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing
the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right
to respect for their private life. It is also understandable that the
women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their
identity. 148

Although the Court acknowledged that many human rights groups
have objected to the French prohibition law as “disproportionate,”149
and that some voices consider this law “islamaphobic,” 150 the Judges
ruled they are not in the position to intervene in domestic political
debates that result in limitations of fundamental rights. 151 Nevertheless,
the Court reiterated that:
[A] State which enters into a [sensitive] legislative process . . . takes
the risk of contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which
affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the

146. Id. ¶ 142.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 146.
149. Id. ¶ 147.
150. Id. ¶ 149.
151. Id. (ruling that “[it] is admittedly not for the Court to rule on whether
legislation is desirable in such matters.”)
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expression of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to
promote tolerance. 152

The Court also noted that the prohibition law was not designed to
protest against the “religious connotation” of face-covering veils. 153
Rather, the ban is “solely” meant to combat the concealment of the
face. 154 At the same time, the Court admitted that the ban leads to a
decrease of pluralism in the French society. 155 By situating itself as
such, the Court is not refrained from being genuinely sympathetic about
the French struggle in this case, which seeks to protect and ensure:
[A] principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is
essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic
152. Id. (the Court also says “that remarks which constitute a general, vehement
attack on a religious or ethnic group are incompatible with the values of tolerance,
social peace and non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall
within the right to freedom of expression that it protects.”).
153. Id. ¶ 151.
154. Id. However, neutralizing the ban as merely a legal project that is not
singling out religious face-covering dresses in public qua religious is a gross denial
of the parliamentary history behind this ban. The history attests to the fact the ban
was certainly designed to stop Muslim women from wearing face-covering dresses.
The arguments used by the French Minister of Justice defending this ban in the
Assemblée nationale, leave no ambiguity about this. She argues the French style of
Islam respects French laws and she refers to the role Imams will play in explaining
the prohibition law to their worshippers and community. In addition, the many
exceptions the law makes for other groups to cover their faces, either for religious or
non-religious purposes, clearly reveals that the prohibition not only aimed to single
out the burqa and niqab for a special ban, but also introduces a French Islam that is
compatible with the ideal of “living together.” See Assemblée nationale, supra note
78, at 5417; see also Sofie G. Syed, Liberte, Egalite, Vie Privee: The Implications of
France’s Anti-Veil Laws for Privacy and Autonomy, 40 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 301,
306 (2017); W. Cole Jr. Durham & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism,
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421,
450 (1993) (discussing how seemingly neutral laws affect religious minorities: “The
major problem is that any neutral, generally applicable law, however insignificant and
ill-conceived, can trump religious liberty. This places smaller religious groups that
lack significant political influence at constant risk of having their religious freedom
rights violated by an intolerant or inadvertently insensitive majority.”). Cf. R. J.
Delahunty, Does Animal Welfare Trump Religious Liberty? The Danish Ban on
Kosher and Halal Butchering, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 341 (2015).
155. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 149.
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society . . . It can thus be said that the question whether or not it
should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places
constitutes a choice of society. 156

Against this backdrop, the Court refrained from making a value
judgment about how the French decided to establish and maintain their
society. The criticism entailed that “such review will lead it to assess a
balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process within
the society in question.” 157 Thus, in cases characterized by a high
amount of sensitivity and polarization, the primacy lies with the
national legislator. This means France has a broad margin of
appreciation to decide upon the admissibility of face-covering dresses
in public, in light of the “living together” ideal that it aims to ensure.
To justify this wide margin, the Court referred to the lack of consensus
amongst its member states with regard to the legality of face-covering
veils. 158
The Court reasoned that given the broad margin of appreciation
France has in this case, the interference on religious freedom caused by
the prohibition law, pursues a legitimate aim. 159 This legitimate aim
ensures “living together” as part of protecting the rights and freedoms
of others. This legitimate limitation is, according to the Court,
necessary in a democratic society. 160 Therefore, there was no violation
of religious freedom or any other right. 161 This way of reasoning
revealed that the margin of appreciation doctrine is very sensitive
toward reinforcing majoritarianism that effectively advances a
particular political agenda. 162
156. Id. ¶ 154.
157. Id.
158. Id. ¶ 156.
159. Id. ¶ 157.
160. Id. ¶ 158.
161. Id. ¶¶ 156-159.
162. For example, the Court held that it needs to be restrained in opining about
the lawfulness of “matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic
society may reasonably differ widely.” In such cases, the Court says, “the role of the
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.” See id. ¶ 154. This facially
neutral consideration is problematic for many reasons. But most importantly, it is
problematic because the Court neglects its main task: giving protection to
subordinated and marginalized people who seek protection under the law. Drawing
on technical reasoning that gives majorities a wide margin of discretion effectively
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B. “Majoritarian-proof” Making of Diversity
How can we understand the “abrupt” endorsement of “living
together” in S.A.S.? 163 The adoption of this novel legitimate limitation
ground on religious freedom reveals the use of a majoritarian lens and
language to eventually decide the admissibility of contentious and norm
deviant practices of minorities. 164
This approach immediately
implicates that majoritarian ideas about the acceptability of contentious
religious manifestations, such as wearing face-covering veils in public,
matter very much in the justification of imposed restrictions upon
“unwelcome” practices of religious groups. This reinforces and
legitimizes the search, construction and maintenance of a collective
cultural identity. 165 In other words, pursing and developing a shared
narrative about the roots and character of the society, either secular or
Judeo-Christian, results in “majoritarianism.” 166 This majoritarian
narrative aims to protect the native “national” identity that tells us more
about “who we are.” The construction of this “common background”
advances their political agenda. See also Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rightly pointing out that the judiciary must correct
political branches of power when they obviously neglect constitutional rights).
163. Cf. Kristin Henrard, Exploring the Potential (Contribution) of MultiDisciplinary Legal Research for the Analysis of Minorities’ Rights, 8 ERASMUS L.
REV. 111, 120 (2015) (criticizing the way the Court has assessed the different interests
in S.A.S., speaking of a poorly motivated decision).
164. LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (speaks about the decisiveness of majorities
sensitivities for the acceptability of minorities’ practices); Joppke, supra note 23, at
95-99 (discussing the preference for the preserve of the majoritarian practices in the
case law of the ECtHR); Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An
Incommensurable Divide?, in TALAL ASAD ET AL. (EDS.), IS CRITIQUE SECULAR?
BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 79 (2009) (discussing how “majoritarian
cultural sensibilities” challenge the beliefs and practices of Muslim minorities across
Europe).
165. Trotter, supra note 61, at 169.
166. Cf. Ratna Kapur, The Ayodhya Case: Hindu Majoritarianism and the
Right to Religious Liberty, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 (2014) (discussing how a local
Indian court’s judgment has contributed to the establishment of “Hindu
Majoritarianism,” affecting the rights of the Muslim minority). Cf. also Loren E.
Mulraine, Religious Freedom: The Original Civil Liberty, 61 HOWARD L.J. 147, 149
(2017) (defending religious liberty and warning against the rise of nationalism that
threatens this fundamental liberty). See also Bridgette Dunlap, Protecting the Space
to Be Unveiled: Why France’s Full Veil Ban Does Not Violate the European
Convention on Human Rights, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 968 (2012).
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leads to the immediate accusation of “disloyalty” for those who do not
share the majoritarian narrative, or who cannot comply with
majoritarian expectations about how one should live a life. 167 Hence,
reinforcing majoritarianism advances ethnocentrism. This shift reduces
the free exercise of fundamental rights for minorities who do not fit the
perfect majoritarian picture. 168
A timely example of the endorsement and reinforcement of
majoritarianism is the Court’s ruling in S.A.S., which uniquely justifies
its legitimate limitation ground against religious freedom in the pursuit
of “living together.” 169 This expansion of the limitation grounds is
167. Indeed, the dominant idea suggests: who can be against the dominant
narrative that tells us more about “who we are”? Cf. Beydoun, supra note 10, at 1764
(discussing how some have labeled U.S. Muslims as disloyal in the post-9/11 terrorist
attacks era); Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s
Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 39 (2014)
(elaborating on how Muslim women in the U.S. have been accused of “disloyalty”
because of their extant Islamic appearance, such as wearing headscarves); David
Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the First
Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 120 (2012) (describing the logic
used by authorities that result in considering Muslims as “disloyal”); Nagwa Ibrahim,
The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L.
121, 142 (2008) (arguing how the “racialization” of Muslims as disloyal citizens have
created “a new zone of lawlessness where they are neither citizen nor alien, but rather
belong to [the] inherently evil world called “Islam.”“). See also Nehal Bhuta, Two
Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights, 113 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 9, 25 (2014) (discussing ECtHR case law, framing Islamic headscarves
as incompatible with democratic values).
168. See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; LABORDE, supra note 39; Joppke,
supra note 23; Kapur, supra note 166; Mahmood, supra note 164 (sharing the point
of view that using majoritarian standards in the legal assessment of minority practices
results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: merciful for the majority and stingy in
granting exemptions to religious minorities).
169. However, the outcome of the case is not surprising nor unique. It was
even predictable as it fits a notorious line of jurisprudence that has been set out by the
ECtHR, which is not merciful but stingy toward the habits and beliefs of the Muslim
minority in Europe. See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33 (“The European Court of
Human Rights freedom of religion jurisprudence has notoriously been lenient toward
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the presence of
Islam in the public sphere.”); see generally Keturah A. Dunner, Addressing Religious
Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of Article 9 of the European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117
(1999). In other words, S.A.S. fits the overall Islamophobic case law of the ECtHR,
which is part of an Islamophobic atmosphere that is currently dominating debates on
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thought-provoking and prone to criticism. 170 What does the normative
attitude of the Court in S.A.S. tell us about the role of religion in liberal
political philosophy? 171
1. The Prohibition Law and Majoritarianism
Does the judgment reflect support for the French struggle of
ensuring and reinforcing the minimum requirements of life in society
thereby backing “living together” in a French style? 172 In addition, does

migration and the place of Islam in Western democracies. See Wahedi, supra note 22
(describing Islamophobia merely as the fear for the Islam and Muslims and providing
some recent examples of this tendency); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE
NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS
AGE (2012) (discussing the contemporary fear toward religious minorities,
particularly the Muslim minority, in the Western world); Martha C. Nussbaum, In
Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 379 (2000).
170. The Court’s expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds is one of the
most prominent points of criticisms toward the judgment in S.A.S. Cf. Brett G.
Scharffs, Islam and Religious Freedom: The Experience of Religious Majorities and
Minorities, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 78, 96 (2018) (saying that the
justification of the ban on grounds of “living together” has been criticized as
expansion of the legitimate limitation grounds).
171. The central question of this liberal paradigm is: what role does religion
play for the purposes of religious accommodation and justification of public policies?
See Wahedi, supra note 45 (claiming that religion is not a unique protection-worthy
category qua religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy); LABORDE,
supra note 39 (discussing the emphasis on egalitarianism in contemporary liberal
theories of religious freedom and calling upon legal philosophers to think about
religion as an interpretive concept); LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39, at 1-5
(identifying four types of debates concerning the question of religion in liberal
political philosophy. First, the debate concerning the specialness of religion for legal
purposes. Second, the religion neutrality debate. Third, the question of religious
accommodation. Fourth, the debate on the relationship between religion and
comparable, though non-sectarian categories, such as conscience and identity); Carlo
Invernizzi Accetti, Religious Truth and Democratic Freedom, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 293-94 (Jean Louise Cohen &
Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (criticizing and providing an explanation for why within
the paradigm of liberal political philosophy religious arguments are systematically
labelled as inadmissible or reformulated in neutral terms).
172. Thus, does the S.A.S. judgment strengthen “forced assimilation” of French
citizens who do not have a “native” French background, through allowing
mechanisms that encourage minorities to adopt the majoritarian French lifestyle? See
Syed, supra note 154, at 303 (qualifying the prohibition law as “assimilationist”); see
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this jurisprudential expansion force minorities to follow the
majoritarian choice of society, 173 providing little room for the habits,
traditions, and ideas that diverge from this majoritarian norm? 174 In
sum, how does the Court’s judgment in S.A.S. fit the tendency of
reinforcing majoritarianism and what does this mean for diversity and
free exercise of religion? 175 To answer this question, we need to clarify
which majoritarian ideas the Court has embraced and reinforced. The
search for this answer helps us in two ways. First, it enables us to
develop a theoretical framework we can use to embed the Court’s
approach. Second, it helps us to map the implications of the
endorsement of majoritarianism for diversity and the free exercise of
religion. 176 To conceptualize the Court’s decision in S.A.S. we need to
focus on the arguments used by the judges to justify the expansion of
the limitation grounds with “living together,” resulting in the
justification of the imposed ban on wearing face-covering dresses in
public.
Although, the Court’s reasoning is meandering in this respect and
often very contradictory, the overall outcome of this case affirms the
large body of criticism that accuses the Court of being “overtly
intolerant toward the presence of Islam in the public sphere.” 177 This
also Yusuf, supra note 69, at 284 (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces policies that are
meant to assimilate minorities).
173. S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 153-154 (the question of having or not a ban on
wearing face-covering dresses in public concerns a “choice of society.” The Court
says in this respect that it “has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of
Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has
been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question.”)
174. See LARBODE, supra note 39, at 33; Daly, supra note 27, at 165 (criticizing
the use of majoritarian standards as yardstick in assessing the admissibility of minority
practices).
175. Cf. Trotter, supra note 61, at 169 (warning for the shift toward a collective
culture that is little merciful toward the religious demands of minorities, analyzing the
post-”living together” judgments).
176. See Kapur, supra note 166, at 307.
177. LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33; Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26 (arguing that
the ECtHR provides more room for majoritarian practices, while it adopts a militant
secularist approach in assessing the legality of minority practices—in particular with
regard to headscarves—resulting in the “equation of Islamic religious practices with
intolerance, discrimination, and inequality,” which obviously do not deserve
protection under the Convention). See generally Wahedi, supra note 45; Joppke,
supra note 23.
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theoretical critique provides a fruitful insight in the general attitude of
the Court toward contentious religious practices of a non-native
minority. Therefore, this critique also helps to conceptualize the
Court’s decision in S.A.S—paving the way toward conceptualizing the
Court’s approach toward diversity.
This part argues that justifying far-reaching restrictions upon
religious freedom with an appeal on “living together” aims to make
diversity, as a concept, majoritarian-proof. That is to say: what is
considered protection-worthy under “diversity” depends on
majoritarian sensitivities, standards, and ideas about how people in a
society should behave and live. 178
Making diversity majoritarian-proof is meant to pass hard cases
regarding the legality of contentious practices through the skeptical and
critical lens of the majority, which aims to promote its own narrative.
This results in an asymmetrical toleration regime: protective toward the
rights, habits, and beliefs of the “native” majority, but intolerant,
reactionary, and aggressive toward the exemption claims of “nonnative” minorities, such as Muslims. 179 What evidence do we have to
178. See Mahmood, supra note 164, at 68.
179. See generally Wahedi, supra note 22. See Mahmood, supra note 164 at
86 (referring to Peter G. Danchin and discussing the criticism that qualifies the ECtHR
attitude as “hypocritical,” allegedly protecting the Christian majority, and being
intolerant toward the Muslim minority); Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and
Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, at 275 (2008) (referring to critics of the ECtHR case law and
concluding that “there appears to be a bias in the jurisprudence of the Court under
article 9 toward protecting traditional and established religions and a corresponding
insensitivity toward the rights of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious
groups.”); see also Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27 (Jean Louise Cohen
& Cécile Laborde eds., 2016) (asking rhetorically with respect to the systematically
different legal treatment of Islamic cases before the ECtHR: “Do the cases . . . reflect
a Christian Islamophobia in the principled garb of secularism?”); Bhuta, supra note
167, at 26 (criticizing the double standard that is seemingly used by the ECtHR to
assess the admissibility of the manifestations of Muslims and Christians. “When it
comes to Christian religious values, their potential inconsistency with democracy,
equality, and tolerance is never in doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which this
line of cases rests not on a thoroughgoing rationalist secularism but on a political
theology of Christian democracy in which the identity of democratic values with an
imagined Christian civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”). For a similar argument
raised in the United States, see Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels
Incompatible with Law: Examining Overlapping Jurisdictions in Private Law, 4
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claim that the Court has interpreted the limitation grounds upon
religious freedom in a way that makes diversity ultimately
“majoritarian proof?”
For the answer to this question we need to briefly recall the
objectives of the French prohibition law. This discursive approach
helps us see how the Court’s endorsement of “living together” through
an extensive interpretation of the legitimate limitation ground that
attempts to protect the rights and freedoms of others has actually
resulted in the reinforcement of majoritarianism. 180 In other words,
attempting to protect the rights and freedoms of others is making
diversity majoritarian-proof. The historical background of the
prohibition law reveals that the ban has been considered necessary to:
protect French secularism, rescue women who are victims of genderinequality, and reaffirm fraternalism; as the full-face veil constitutes a
breach of the French style of “living together” in public. 181 In short, the
veil has been considered a sectarian “rejection of the values of the
Republic,” which makes social interaction impossible. 182
The French authorities defended the limitation this law posed upon
religious freedom as necessary for national security, and defending the
rights and freedoms of others, which should guarantee a minimum
amount of respect for the values of an open and democratic society. 183
The majoritarian argument suggests that face-covering veils do not
belong to the “real” France, as these pieces of clothing make open
communication impossible. The “true” Frenchman respects equality,
human dignity, and is willing to interact socially in public. 184 The veil
allegedly contradicts this majoritarian tradition.
However, the Court convincingly debunked the national security
arguments, 185 and most of the arguments relating to the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others, such as the gender-equality

FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 371 (2013) (criticizing the stinginess of those who defend
religious arbitration, but do not want to extend that right to Muslims).
180. For a comparable method applied to reach the same conclusion, compare
Kapur, supra note 166, at 307.
181. S.A.S. v. France ¶¶ 17; 24-25.
182. Id. ¶ 25.
183. Id. ¶ 82.
184. Cf. id. ¶ 25.
185. Id. ¶ 139.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

39

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 2
Wahedi camera ready (Do Not Delete)

5/8/2019 12:02 PM

252 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
argument 186 and the human dignity argument. 187 Nevertheless, the
Court interpreted the protection argument to justify the imposition of
far reaching restrictions upon the free exercise of religious freedom
with an appeal on ensuring the French style of “living together.” 188 At
first sight, this extensive interpretation of the Court is not only very
remarkable but also very problematic because it reinforces
majoritarianism and establishes ethnocentrism.
The Court’s endorsement of “living together” is only remarkable in
light of the Court’s arguments discussing the legitimacy of the ban’s
aims and its necessity in a democratic society. As such, the Court has
countlessly reaffirmed the importance and the value of pluralism and
tolerance in democratic societies that are seemingly endangered by the
prohibition law. 189 The Court also shared its concerns of animosity
toward religious minorities at different points and called upon all parties
involved to look for the dialogue instead of clashes and
confrontation. 190 Thus, it is hard to believe the same Court has
developed an argumentation pattern that contradicts the emphasis on
tolerance, pluralism, and diversity. In fact, the Court’s reasoning itself
is intolerant and disrespectful toward “the other.”
2. The Reconciliation of Diversity with Majoritarian Sensitivities
The Court’s argument, as a whole, is contradictory. On the one
hand, it emphasizes pluralism, broadmindedness, and the ability to
develop unique identities. On the other hand, it shows understanding
for “an established consensus” about public performance. 191 This
contradictory way of reasoning can only be understood against the
backdrop of a decisive and proven formula insinuated between the
Court’s reasoning in S.A.S. The judges reiterate that: “[in] democratic
societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same
population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. ¶ 118.
Id. ¶ 120.
Id. ¶¶ 142.
Id. ¶ 128.
Id. ¶¶ 128; 149; 152.
Id. ¶ 122.
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manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of
the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”192
This reconciliation strategy that aims to protect the rights and
freedoms of others, generally the majority, has proven to be a very
effective formula in finding justifications for far-reaching restrictions
upon free exercise of religion. As such, in Dahlab v. Switzerland
(“Dahlab”), although the Court declared the applicant’s complaints
about violating her right to manifest her religion inadmissible, it
accepted the idea that wearing headscarves is problematic because this
practice:
[A]ppears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square
with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey
to their pupils. 193

With reference to this Dahlab reconciliation formula, the Court in
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (“Şahin”) again draws on prejudiced and hostile
arguments to justify the Turkish ban on wearing religious symbols at
the university. 194 While this ban was still enforced, the Court argued
that in such places:
[W]here the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and,
in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being
taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant
authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the
institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such values to
allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic
headscarf, to be worn. 195

The Court used a very similar argument in its merciless judgments
in Dahlab and Şahin to help reconstruct the Court’s logic in S.A.S.,
192. Id. ¶ 126.
193. Dahlab v. Switzerland, ECthr at 13 (2001).
194. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 116; 111
(2005) (addressing the reconciliation formula of Dahlab).
195. Id.
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resulting in the endorsement of “living together” as a legitimate
limitation ground against the free exercise of religion. The Court stated
that
[it] can understand the view that individuals who are present in
places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes
developing there which would fundamentally call into question the
possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an
established consensus, forms an indispensable element of
community life within the society in question.196

Reconciling diversity questions—dealing with inclusiveness—
with majoritarian sensitivities relating to integration and assimilation of
minority groups is not helpful “to hold the coordinate branches to
account when they defy our most sacred legal commitments.”197
Furthermore, as these cases have revealed, reconciling diversity with
majoritarian sensitives equates to “blindly accepting the Government’s
misguided invitation to sanction [discriminatory policies] motivated by
animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial
claim of [for example] national security, gender-equality or living
together.” 198
3. The Reinforcement of Majoritarianism
The Court in S.A.S. v. France accepted that wearing full facecovering veils is a breach of the right to live together with others, which
“under certain conditions,” can be related to the limitation ground that
aims to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 199 Thus, the Court
found that in this case the veil is the trouble maker, as it does not fit a
protection-worthy “established consensus” about how one should dress
in public. The Court reaffirmed the reconciliation formula of Dahlab
through Sahin, 200 and ruled that because the French aim is to ensure
“living together” through defending and protecting “a principle of
interaction,” it is not for an international Court to give a value judgment
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 126.
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about the “choice of society,” which is the exclusive right of French
citizens. 201 The Court uses this reasoning along with the fact that
European states are very much divided on the legality of wearing facecovering veils in public to provide France with a wide margin of
appreciation. 202 However, relating the French wide margin of
appreciation to the legality of face-covering dresses in other European
states, does little to hide the reconciliation strategy that is clearly
present in this case. The application of this strategy results in a
majoritarian-proof version of diversity. 203
In S.A.S., the majoritarian concern was the incompatibility of the
burqa and niqab in public with the French lifestyle, or the French way
of “living together,” which allegedly prescribes an “open visor.” 204 The
Court’s decision in S.A.S. reaffirms and declares the French “open
visor” theory, a majoritarian narrative about “living together,” as a
protection worthy category in law. This “living together” narrative
could be invoked against the manners of minorities that counter and
harm the majoritarian narrative about how people should behave in
public. 205
S.A.S. reinforces majoritarianism in a further way.
The
endorsement of “living together” promotes the majoritarian narrative,
which prescribes the conditions under which one can be considered a
201. Id. ¶¶ 153-154.
202. Id. ¶ 155.
203. Id. ¶ 128. It is very confusing to read what the Court says in S.A.S. about
majoritarian desires in a democratic society: “democracy does not simply mean that
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which
ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a
dominant position.” However, it seems that the Court has operated in another way.
204. The concern regarding “the public manners” is illustrated by the fact that
an overwhelming majority of both chambers previously voted in favor of the
prohibition law. See Assemblée nationale, supra note 78; Sénat, supra note 72; see
also Ralf Michaels, Banning Burqas: The Perspective of Postsecular Comparative
Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 238 (2018) (providing insights into the
impossibility to reconcile the desire to wear face-covering veils in public with the
French conception of “living together”).
205. Eva Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 58,
70 (2016) (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in S.A.S. “legitimizes a majority banning
minority expressions from the entire public sphere on the sole basis of an ideological
position that is the expression of the majority’s culture.”). Cf. Daly, supra note 27, at
161 (arguing that the “living together” ideology burdens religious and ethnic
minorities more than the established majority).
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real French citizen. S.A.S. clearly shows that one of the crucial elements
in this respect is not only the ability to socialize in public, but also
showing the willingness to do that through an “open visor,” leaving
little room for those who do not want to socialize publicly. 206
C. The “Sacrifice” of a Fundamental Right
S.A.S. reinforced majoritarianism through an extensive
interpretation of the limitation grounds of religious freedom by
prioritizing the “living together” narrative. Subsequently, the Court has
moved away from its traditionally used “religious freedom”
rationale, 207 by reconciling diversity questions with majoritarian
sensitivities about the acceptability of non-majoritarian practices, such
as wearing face-covering dresses in public. This approach ultimately
favors “the cultural and religious beliefs of the majority population.”208
The downside of a majoritarian-proof-made-diversity is that nonnative religions are “treated as a second-class religion not entitled to the
same sort of consideration as the Christian faith.” 209 Within this
framework, the crucifix is allowed for reasons of diversity, as it does
not counter majoritarian concerns about tolerance or human dignity.
The Islamic hijab, however, both headscarves and face-covering
dresses, is not considered a primary matter of diversity—but rather a
practice that threatens the majoritarian culture about gender equality,

206. Cf. Jill Marshall, S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or
Empowerment of Identities, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 377, 385 (2015) (criticizing the
Court’s willingness to accept the French perception of “living together” that
necessitates a ban on face-covering veils in public, and “effectively bulldozes a right
to personal identity unless that identity is acceptable and permissible in the eyes of
the majority.”).
207. The religious freedom rationale considers religious freedom a right that
promotes pluralism, while enabling human beings to develop unique identities and
live in accordance with their own conception of life. See Trispiotis, supra note 37, at
581 (referring to critics of S.A.S. accusing the Court of having favored majoritarian
ideas at the expense of religious freedom).
208. Mahmood, supra note 164, at 86. See generally Samuel P. Kovach-Orr,
Banning the Burka: Indicative of a Legitimate Aim or a Thinly-Veiled Attempt to
Legislate Religious and Cultural Intolerance, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 89
(2016).
209. Moyn, supra note 179, at 29 (based on an analysis of the ECtHR case law).
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human dignity, ethical integrity, and tolerance in general. 210 This
reconciliation strategy does not rely “on a thoroughgoing rationalist
secularism but on a political theology of Christian democracy, in which
the identity of democratic values with an imagined Christian
civilizational tradition is unquestioned.” 211 This has far-reaching
consequences for religious liberty, however, as free exercise becomes
dependent upon the sensitivities of the majority.
Therefore, does the reinforcement of majoritarianism result in the
subordination of religious freedom to principles that are designed to
promote the majoritarian narrative? 212 It does. 213 The reinforcement of
the French style of “living together” grossly limits the way people
develop their personal and unique identities. It also limits the
opportunity to pursue a life in accordance with their own beliefs on how
to present themselves in public. 214 In a sense, the Court’s judgment in
S.A.S. has not only “sacrificed” the free exercise of a very important
liberty, 215 but it has also provided lip service to a majoritarian political

210. See Syed, supra note 154, at 308 (describing the French perception of the
Islamic hijab as a symbol of “Muslim oppression from which Muslim women need
deliverance at the hands of secular actors”); see also Bhuta, supra note 167, at 29
(“One of the fears concerning Dahlab’s headscarf was that it might invite curious
questions from pupils leading to a discussion of her religious beliefs and, thereby, a
risk of offense or coercion of children and their parents. The crucifix poses no such
threat, and the possibility that it could stimulate a dialogue about religious beliefs is
welcomed as conducive to tolerance.”)
211. Bhuta, supra note 167, at 26. See generally Joseph H. H. Weiler, Freedom
of Religion and Freedom from Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759
(2013).
212. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2 (arguing that “the opinion of the majority . . . sacrifices concrete
individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles.”).
213. Syed, supra note 154, at 314 (arguing that the French arguments in favor
of the prohibition law have supported Islamophobia).
214. Cf. S.A.S. v. France ¶ 124 (the “freedom of thought, conscience and
religion is . . . in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life . . . .”).
215. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in
S.A.S. v. France ¶ 2.
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agenda. 216 This agenda has set out its minimum expectations of
citizenship for its minorities in the receiving society. 217
Through its interpretation of “living together,” the Court has
advanced a political agenda regarding the role and the place of the Islam
in liberal democracies. 218 This agenda reaffirms the majoritarian
narrative that tells us who we are and what our binding characteristics
are, not only historically, but also in terms of building a common future.
In other words, this agenda reinforces a national and collective identity
agenda. 219 Formulated in this way, the Court’s jurisprudence on the
216. Id.
217. Cf. Kapur, supra note 166, at 311 (illustrating how the legal discourse in
India reinforced a majoritarian political agenda). See also Michaels, supra note 204,
at 238 (arguing that within the French context, the prohibition law should be
understood as a matter of “a civil duty . . . . By requiring the Muslim woman to take
off her face veil, the state creates a positive duty for her to express her belonging to
the state.”); Stephane Mechoulan, France Bans the Veil: What French Republicanism
Has to Say about It, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 223, 273 (2017); Daly, supra note 27, at 164
(arguing that the prohibition law can be considered a tool for the purpose of protecting
a “republican habitus”); Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Stephanie Berry
who has argued that the “living together” argument is in favor of a “distinctly
assimilationist agenda.”); Susan S. M. Edwards, No Burqas We’re French: The Wide
Margin of Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling, 26 DENNING L.J. 246, 258
(2014) (claiming that S.A.S. reinforces the French assimilation agenda).
218. Trispiotis, supra note 37, at 591 (quoting Eva Brems, who has suggested
that the argument of “living together” in the context of face covering veils reflects
“the fundamental unease of a large majority of people with the idea of an Islamic face
veil, and the widespread feeling that this garment is undesirable in ‘our society’.”);
Myriam Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National
Identity and Religious Freedom, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 613, 615 (2012) (arguing that
the French ban on both wearing headscarves at school and face-covering veils in
public are “legal expression of the French sensitivity to the presence of Islam in the
public sphere.”).
219. Michaels, supra note 204, at 215; Trotter, supra note 61, at 169; Syed,
supra note 154, at 322. A very recent example of adjusting to the dominant norms is
present in Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland. In this case, the ECtHR held that
the Swiss authorities’ denial to exempt Muslim girls from taking part in mixed-school
swimming does not violate the right to religious freedom. Here, the judges
unanimously held that although denial of the exemption request interfered with
religious freedom, this interference was justified in light of the promotion of pupils’
integration into Swiss society. See Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No.
29086/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017). In a similar case, a Muslim pupil had asked the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG),
to review a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, the
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lawfulness of laws that burden Muslim citizens, is difficult to reconcile
with the notions of tolerance, equality, and respect.
The same is true for the European Parliament’s recent
recommendations that singled out Islamic institutions for a disfavored
treatment qua Islam. With its proposal to shut down mosques that
violate the EU’s values and its call to develop education programs that
can spread a “moderate” version of Islam, the Parliament reinforces
majoritarianism and advances political Islamophobia that
institutionalizes Islam and Muslim fear. 220 Like the ECtHR, the
European Parliament has aimed to reconcile “Islam” with majoritarian
sensitivities about terrorism, radicalization, and security matters in
general. This resulted in the European Parliament drafting far-reaching
proposals that ultimately treat the Islamic faith as a second-class
religion—instead of a particular conception of life that helps human
beings to flourish.
In sum, S.A.S. illustrates how the use of the “living together”
argument has resulted in limiting the free exercise of religion and the
reinforcement of a majoritarian political agenda suggesting how people
should act in public. Additionally, EU Parliament’s recommendations
(relying on reconciliation strategy) will have serious consequences for
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG). The BVerwG had ruled that the school
authorities’ refusal to exempt applicant from joint swimming lessons did not violate
the right to religious freedom. The BVerfG did not accept the complaint for
adjudication, as the petitioner failed to explain convincingly why the burkini could
not qualify as a religious alternative for other swimming clothes.
See
Bundesverfassungsgericht, BvR 3237/13, ¶ III.3.aa, Nov. 7, 2016 (Germ.); Sohail
Wahedi, BVerfG 3237/13, 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 426 (2017) (on file with
author). The problem with this way of reasoning is that the judge sits on the clergy.
On this specific criticism, see Faizan Mustafa & Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, Freedom of
Religion in India: Current Issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy, 2017 BYU L.
REV. 915, 953 (2017) (on file with author) (critical of the way the Indian Supreme
Court has introduced an “essentiality” test that aims to examine which practices do
belong to a faith, “[elevating] the judiciary to the status of clergy.”).
220. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 12, recommendation 15 (“Urges the
Member States to encourage and tolerate only ‘practices of Islam’ that are in full
accordance with EU values.”); recommendation 17 (“invites the Commission and the
Member States to develop and fund a network of European religious scholars that can
spread - and testify to - practices of Islam that are compliant with EU values.”);
recommendation 20 (“Urges the Member States to close without delay mosques and
places of worship and ban associations that do not adhere to EU values and incite to
terrorist offences, hatred, discrimination or violence.”).
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equal treatment of the adherents of different religious groups.
Therefore, the reconciliation strategy has given diversity a majoritarian
content, fitting the sensitivities of the established majority and leaving
little room for unpopular faiths, such as the Islam, and non-majoritarian
religious manifestations, such as the full-face veil in public. Thus, such
religious manifestations fail to satisfy the protection-worthy version of
diversity that encompasses important liberal democratic values, like
human dignity and gender equality. 221
II. ABSTRACTION FROM THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION
The question is whether this majoritarian-proof-making approach
to “diversity” is compatible with the egalitarian and non-sectarian
understanding of religion and religious freedom. To answer this
question, this part first outlines the broader context of S.A.S. and the EU
Parliament’s recommendations, which concerns the question of religion
in liberal political philosophy. Second, it develops a theoretical
framework for religion and religious freedom within the paradigm of
liberal political philosophy. Third, this theoretical framework will be
used to reflect on the reconciliation of “diversity” with the dominant
view regarding the desirability and legality of “contentious religious
manifestations.” The next question asks: is the “reconciliation strategy”
a paradigmatic expression of recent developments in legal theory and
liberal political philosophy about the role of “religion” for the
justification of religious accommodation and public decisions taken in
law and politics?

221. Michaels, supra note 204, at 227 (arguing that “regardless of whether the
face veil is cultural or political or both, classifying it as nonreligious has an advantage:
if the face veil is not religious, then the woman who wears it cannot invoke freedom
of religion to do so. If she has been forced to wear it by family members, then the ban
provides her with protection. If she has freely chosen to wear it . . . then this choice
is inherently suspicious, because it shows that the woman is either against gender
equality, or in favor of a politically suspicious movement.”). See also Siobhán
O’Grady, After refusing a handshake, a Muslim couple was denied Swiss citizenship,
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/18/
after-refusing-handshake-muslim-couple-was-denied-swiss-citizenship/?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.74b13ae51014 (reporting about the Swiss denial to grant a Muslim
couple citizenship after they insisted in their rejection to shake hands with the opposite
gender).
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A. Religion in the Paradigm of Liberal Political Philosophy
The recurring conflict in liberal democracies between competing
religious demands and established legal norms has resulted in a
principled debate in legal theory and liberal political philosophy
regarding the role of religion in law and politics. 222 Religious
manifestations that compete with legal and majoritarian norms of
liberal democracies have accelerated the need for clarification of the
question: does religion qua religion deserve any special protection? 223
More specifically, should liberal democracies care about religion qua
religion for the public justification of decisions taken in law and
222. Cf. debates on the legality of Islamic veils in public, ritual circumcisions
of children, ministerial exceptions, mixed school swimming cases and the religious
slaughter cases. See Mechoulan, supra note 217 (contextualizing the French
prohibition law); Trotter, supra note 61 (analyzing how the “living together”
argument has played a role in a couple of recent judgments); Wahedi, supra note 54
(discussing the “double standards” argument in the debate on the legality of ritual
circumcisions); Yasmine Ergas, Regulating Religion Beyond Borders, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 66 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile
Laborde eds., 2016) (discussing the legality of female circumcision from a law and
religion perspective); see generally Jeremy A. Rovinsky, The Cutting Edge: The
Debate over Regulation of Ritual Slaughter in the Western World, 45 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 79 (2014) (discussing the legality of ritual slaughter in Western democracies).
223. See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, An Unjust Dogma: Why a Special
Right to Religion Wrongly Discriminates against Non-Religious Worldviews, 54 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 217 (2017); Arif A. Jamal, Considering Freedom of Religion in a PostSecular Context: Hapless or Hopeful? 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 433 (2017);
Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017); Brett
G. Scharffs, Why Religious Freedom - Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously
Indifferent, and Those Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957
(2017); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); Tara
Smith, Religious Liberty or Religious License: Legal Schizophrenia and the Case
against Examptions, 32 J.L. & POL. 43 (2016); LABORDE, supra note 39; SMITH,
supra note 48; LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30; ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013); MICAH
SCHWARTZMAN, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008); Chad Flanders, The
Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QLR 257 (2008); CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2007); James Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941
(2005); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2005). Cf. Steven P. Aggergaard, The Question Speech on Private Campuses and
the Answer Nobody Wants to Hear, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 629 (2018).
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politics? 224 Hence, what do current debates in legal theory and liberal
political philosophy tell us about the way modern liberal democracies
interpret, value, protect, and deal with religious freedom? Is the
outcome of S.A.S. compatible with the existing line of research within
the liberal paradigm of law and religious scholarship? To answer all
these questions, we need to develop a theoretical framework to help us
conceptualize the possible liberal responses to the question whether
religion qua religion deserves special protection. 225
1. Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom
The main distinction in law and religious scholarship on the role of
religion for granting exemptions and justifying decisions in law lies
between liberal and sectarian theories of religious freedom. As such,
sectarian theories justify the special legal solicitude toward religion
with an appeal to some values that are considered distinctly religious. 226
224. Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing the current debate in liberal
political philosophy regarding the role of religion in law and politics consists of two
more specific debates: (1) the role of religion for the purpose of state actions (public
justification debate); and (2) its relevance for granting exemptions (the religious
accommodation debate) to certain groups in society).
225. The main research method of this Part is a conceptual meta-analysis of
positions defended in the “specialness-debate” of religion, with a particular focus on
the liberal theories of religious freedom. To identify the binding characteristic of the
normative positions, this article has developed a matrix of positions. This matrix
focuses on the arguments developed to deal with the question whether religion qua
religion needs special legal protection. An advantage of this method is that it helps to
see what the advantages and disadvantages of a particular concept are. It is also
helpful to see what the alternatives are. See generally Schwartzman, supra note 38,
at 28 (explaining how building up a theory in a systematic way sharpens our mind to
see the inconsistencies in the existing body of knowledge); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. &
BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 45 (2010) (on file with author) (providing a taxonomy
of the various definitions of religion, as used in the case law or defended in the law
and religion scholarship).
226. See generally Lund, supra note 223, at 490 (providing an overview of and
discussing some of the religious arguments in favor of religious freedom); Cécile
Laborde, Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 LAW & PHIL. 581,
582 (2015) (explaining the distinction between liberal and sectarian theories of
religious freedom and arguing that the transcendental value of religion does not justify
religious freedom). For a sectarian justification of religious freedom qua religious,
compare RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL SYSTEM 79, 80-82
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The paradigmatic distinction between sectarian and liberal theories of
religious freedom is present within the paradigm of religion in liberal
political philosophy. 227 There are also hybrid theories of religious
freedom, using a mixture of liberal and sectarian arguments to justify
religious freedom and the legality of certain religious manifestations.228
This section focuses on the liberal theories of religious freedom that
have put the question of religious accommodation under critical
scrutiny, either by challenging or defending the special legal solicitude

(2016) (considering the “protection of suprarationality” as the “ultimate justification”
for protecting religion qua religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A
Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2013); DAVID NOVAK, IN
DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116, 117 (2009) (using a transcendental argument to
justify the special legal protection of religion); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE
FREEDOMS FOR? 57 (1996) (on file with author) (claiming that within the context of
U.S. constitutional law, the “split-level character” could only be clarified in light of
an exclusive “religious justification” of religious freedom); Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (1985) (arguing the liberal state
is not able to ultimately exclude the possibility that religious claims might be true,
which means that the transcendental authority of such claims has more value than the
claims of the state). McConnell continued to defend this line in recent publications.
See Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770,
786-89 (2013).
227. Cf. Paul B. Anderson, Religious Liberty under Communism, 6 J. CHURCH
& ST. 169 (1964) (showing non-liberal, non-sectarian theories of religious freedom).
228. Cf. Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of
Israel in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1 (1990)
(comparing the Israeli approach to religious freedom). The hybrid approach to the
justification of religious freedom should not be confused with quasi-liberal
approaches to religious liberty, which favor the majoritarian religion or the religions
of “recognized” minorities. Compare with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran that contains a sectarian explanation of “religious freedom.” Articles 12 and
13 of Iran’s Constitution exhaustively enumerate religions that are allowed to practice
their faiths within the legal framework of the Islamic Republic. The “recognized”
religions include Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity. The Shia Jafari school of
beliefs is the “eternally immutable” state’s religion. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII
ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (1980) (Iran),
http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page=base, (translation) (last visited Feb. 27,
2019). For a quasi-liberal approach to religious freedom, see the recent proposal of
the Dutch SGP. This party has argued that the state should make a distinction between
religions that have shaped the Dutch tradition (including Christianity and Judaism but
excluding Islam), to protect the Judeo-Christian character of the Dutch culture and
society. See SGP, supra note 30, at 3-4.
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for religion. 229 Essential to the religious accommodation debate is for
whom accommodations should be made for and for what kind of
reasons? 230 These questions are used by legal theorists and liberal
political philosophers to determine the normative tolerance and
protection of religious beliefs and practices in liberal democracies.
In order to identify how the liberal paradigm of the law and
religious scholarship has evolved, we need to categorize the type of
arguments used within this paradigm. Categorizing this paradigm looks
beyond the empirical argument that suggests religion is special because
of religious freedom, accommodation through case law, and people’s
relationship with religion as a special experience that deserves special
protection in law. Rather, this categorization draws on the body of
normative arguments that posit how the law in liberal democracies
should deal with the category of religion. 231 Generally, liberal theories
of religious freedom contain “strong rejectionist” and “soft rejectionist”
responses to the question of whether religion should be treated special
in law. The strong rejectionist responses claim that there is nothing
special about religion that makes it a protection worthy category in law.
Therefore, religion does not deserve any special protection qua

229. See generally LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39.
230. These two questions are helpful to deal in a more systematic way with the
controversies that arise out of free exercise. Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 3 (Brian
Leiter compares an orthodox Sikh boy to a non-Sikh boy from a traditional family.
Both boys want to wear a dagger—the orthodox Sikh boy for religious purposes (he
wants to wear a kirpan, a religious object made of metal that resembles a dagger) and
the other for reasons of tradition. This case questions what the justification would be
to treat the two differently. That is to say, Leiter asks, “[w]hy the state should have
to tolerate exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with
religious obligations but not with any other equally serious obligations of
conscience.”).
231. Basically, the conceptual question of these liberal theories of religious
freedom is: should the law grant religion qua religion special protection, or rather,
should the law treat religion special because of the protection-worthy liberal
substitutes of religion. For the development of this particular argument, I have
benefited tremendously from the feedback of professor Benjamin Berger on the theory
of abstraction during my stay as visiting researcher at Osgoode Hall Law School in
Toronto (Apr. 2017). For a similar method that aims to challenge the empirical
argument, see generally LEITER, supra note 56; DWORKIN, supra note 30;
Schwartzman, supra note 223; Perry, supra note 64; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note
20 (questioning why the law protects religion specially).
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religion. 232 The softer responses cover the body of arguments positing
that the category of religion is not special as such but the liberal
substitutes of religion are special. Therefore, religion is only special by
virtue of abstraction from the religious dimension.
2. A Taxonomy of the Liberal Theories of Religious Freedom
This section develops a conceptual framework of normative
approaches to religion in law. This framework classifies the liberal
positions into five categories. First, principled rejection of arguments
that justify the special legal protection of religion with an appeal to
values that are presented as distinctly religious. Rejectionist arguments
reject qualifying specific beliefs or manifestations as religious. Second,
substitution consists of arguments explaining why religion is a subset
of a broader human faculty, namely conscience. Substitution also
covers arguments that say religious freedom has no distinct
constitutional value, like other liberties, such as the freedom of
expression and association. These in combination with the right to nondiscrimination, in practice could guarantee free exercise of religion.
Third, generalization opposes a sectarian interpretation of religion and
religious freedom, arguing that religion stands for deep ethical
commitments of human beings and that religious freedom is the general
right that gives human beings access to ethical independence and moral
freedom. Fourth, equation, which says that equality of treatment should
be the norm when authorities are dealing with deep commitments of
human beings who ask for exemptions from the application of general
laws. Fifth, representation, which justifies the special legal protection
of religion in light of values that are not necessarily religious in nature.
Religion represents in this position certain values that let human beings
flourish—this particular argument justifies the special legal protection
of religion. 233

232. Basically, the position of Brian Leiter and Kenneth Einar Himma. See
generally LEITER, supra note 56; Himma, supra note 223.
233. The focus is on the appropriate interpretation of “the notion of religion in
law (regardless of whether the category of freedom of religion is upheld or not).”
Laborde, supra note 226, at 594.
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a. Rejection
The rejectionist position discards arguments that justify religious
freedom with an appeal to values that are considered distinctly
religious. This position consists of two broader categories: principled
rejection and non-principled rejection. Non-principled rejection claims
that the concept of religion does not apply to certain beliefs, traditions
or manifestations. 234 Yet, non-principled rejection does not exclude the
option to use the term “religion” to consider other manifestations as
religious for reasons of consensus and tradition. Thus, it promotes the
term “religion” for particular religions and excludes other religions as
not falling under the specific definition of “religion.” The appropriate
example is the rhetorical approach currently present in the political
discourse, which views Islam not as a religion but as a totalitarian
ideology with a closed internal system of rules that prescribe in detail
how one should live his or her life. Against this backdrop, it has been
argued practices and beliefs that are based on Islam should not have
access to the privileges of religious freedom. 235 Principled rejection
draws primarily on the idea that there are no principled reasons to
tolerate religion qua religion within liberal democracies. 236
i. Principled Rejection
The principled rejectionist rejects tolerating religion qua religion
for principled reasons (i.e., reasons that find their origins in morality or
epistemology). This position starts from the question of what toleration
on principled grounds says about the justification of the special legal
protection of religion qua religion. Thus, it questions whether the
concept of toleration provides any room for arguments that justify
religious toleration because of any specialness of religion (i.e.,
distinctly religious values). This sub-position defines pure toleration as
234. See generally AMOS N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 19 (2009).
235. See generally Wahedi, supra note 45.
236. LEITER, supra note 56, at 7, 55, 67; see also Schwartzman, supra note 38,
at 22; Cécile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 423 (Jean Louise Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds.,
2016); DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 111, 144; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 164;
Nickel, supra note 223, at 943; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248; see
generally SULLIVAN, supra note 223; Himma, supra note 223.
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the situation in which the dominant group sees on moral, or epistemic
grounds a reason to allow, or tolerate on such principled grounds,
another group of citizens to continue with acts or manifestations that
are considered objectionable by the dominant group. Principled
rejection draws on this particular definition of toleration and concludes
that the principle of toleration does not require special legal protection
for religion qua religion. 237
The principled rejectionist questions whether one can identify one
or more principled reasons that could justify a toleration regime for
religion qua religion. To answer this question, a distinction is made
between two potentially distinctive characteristics of religion: “the
categoricity of religious commands” and “insulation [of religious
beliefs] from evidence” and reason. 238 This particular feature is closely
related to the argument that religious beliefs might be distinctive due to
their involvement in a “metaphysics of ultimate reality.” 239 According
to this position, the moral reasons for toleration only justify the special
legal protection of human conscience. This moral justification of
liberty of conscience does not simultaneously single out religion and its
categoricity of commands for special legal protection. Thus, no
evidence could support the argument that people in the Rawlsian
“original position” will opt for religious freedom next to equal liberty
of conscience. 240 Hence, the emphasis on the need for liberty of
conscience does not make a distinction between the backgrounds of
conscientious commands—it does not single out religion for a special
favored treatment. 241 Leiter explains this argument as follows:
237. Toleration is usually justified on different types of moral and epistemic
grounds. Brian Leiter concludes there is nothing special, in terms of morality or
epistemology, to warrant toleration of religion qua religion. LEITER, supra note 56,
at 7-13; see LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE. LAW AND RELIGION IN THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 8, n.17 (2012) (providing a broader
definition of toleration).
238. LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34.
239. Id. at 47. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168.
240. Rawlsian morality argues in favor of toleration stating that people in the
original position, when they perform behind the “veil of ignorance,” will definitely
accept some categorical demands, though these are not of a religious nature per se. In
other words, this ground of toleration does not provide a principled argument to
tolerate “religion qua religion.” See generally LEITER, supra note 56, at 55.
241. See Simon Căbulea May, Exemptions for Conscience, in RELIGION IN
LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017)
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Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity together, so
that it is fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil of
ignorance know is that they will accept some categorical demands,
not they will accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose
grounding is a matter of faith. 242

Similarly, the utilitarian moral arguments for toleration (which
focus on the maximization of human well-being that, among others,
depends on the ability of people to live by their conscience) do not
prescribe special protection of religion. Therefore, toleration on moral
grounds does not support the arguments that aim to single out religion
as a matter of principled toleration. 243
The other principled ground for toleration found in the epistemic
arguments draws on an accepted toleration for knowledge expansion.
Interestingly, knowledge expansion conflicts with religion’s second
potentially distinctive feature: insulation of religious beliefs from
evidence and reason. 244 As Leiter argues, it is far from obvious “to
think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are insulated
from evidence and reasons—that is, insulated from epistemically
relevant considerations—will promote knowledge of the truth.”245
Although this argument does not address religious manifestations’
effect on knowledge expansion, it is conceivable to say that principled
rejection equally rejects arguments that aim to justify toleration of
religious conduct, solely because of religion. Arguably, there is no
reason to deny that both religious practices and beliefs are equally
insulated from evidence.

(arguing that accommodation of sincere conscientious objections to generally
applicable laws face the same criticism of unfair treatment as religious
accommodation does).
242. LEITER, supra note 56, at 55; see Andrew Koppelman, A Rawlsian Defence
of Special Treatment for Religion, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
31 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (presenting some Rawlsian
arguments in defense of religious freedom).
243. LEITER, supra note 56, at 55, 61.
244. Leiter argues reliance on Mill’s perspective on what is “true for the right
reasons” will not make a strong case to tolerate religion qua religion for epistemic
reasons; religious faith excludes the idea that there might be some uncovered truth.
Id. at 58.
245. Id. at 55-56.
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ii. Non-Principled Rejection
Non-principled rejection rejects the qualification of certain beliefs,
speeches, or conducts as religious, and is mainly present in political and
legal discourse. As such, one can refer to the political approach of the
Dutch right-wing party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (the Party for Freedom),
toward Islam. This political party has repeatedly argued that Islam is
not a religion, but rather a totalitarian ideology that should not enjoy
the privileges of religious freedom. Consequently, it has proposed an
immigration ban from Islamic countries, legal prohibition of the Koran,
and closure of all mosques and Islamic schools in the Netherlands.246
Non-principled rejection in legal discourse occurs when one asks for
permission to perform a practice that is portrayed as religious but
apparently prohibited by authorities. In some of the cases dealing with
the legal admissibility of norm-deviant practices, the court or other
parties involved refuse to admit that the practice at stake has a
potentially religious dimension. 247
Similarly, in the legal debate related to the Travel Ban of President
Trump, some scholars have explicitly argued that this ban has nothing
to do with religion, purporting that it is related to security concerns.248
Most notably, one of the legal advisors to President Trump revealed the
President-elect asked him about how he could realize his promised
246. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The House of Representatives],
Aanhangsel Handelingen II [Parliamentary Proceedings II], 2016/2017, at 2-6-61
and 2-6-62 (Neth.) (on file with author).
247. Compare with tax exemption litigations of the Scientology Church and the
Church
of
Satan
case:
Hof.
Den
Haag
21
October
2015,
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:2875, ¶ 8.16 (Neth.) (holding that the activities of the
Scientology Church—in particular, Auditing and Training—are commercial in nature
and not religious, serving primarily private interests. Thus, the Church is ineligible
for tax exemptions). The case of Saint-Walburga, which focused on sisters forming
the Church of Satan, turned on the question whether a brothel could be considered a
religious institution. HR 31 October 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9553 (Neth.); Cf.
Religion Based on Sex Gets a Judicial Review, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/02/us/religion-based-on-sex-gets-a-judicialreview.html (discussing a case in which a couple charged for pimping and prostitution
claimed that the activities that took place in the Church were part of their sacred
religion).
248. See generally Michael B. Mukasey, Judicial Independence: The Fortress
Threatened from Within, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1223 (2017) (defending the ban as a
matter of national security) (on file with author).
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Muslim travel ban in a legal way. 249 The advisory team found “danger”
was an appropriate substitute for those coming from Muslim majority
countries—the category of people, the President promised he would
single out for special travel restrictions. 250 The shift from focusing on
security matters and rejecting the religious dimension in this context
was “perfectly sensible, perfectly legal.” 251
b. Substitution
The substitution position claims both religion and religious
freedom have adequate substitutes. 252 Like the rejectionist position,
substitution consists of both principled substitution and non-principled
substitution.253 Principled substitution draws on arguments that view
religion as a subset of a particular faculty that is worthy of special legal
protection.
This protection-worthy faculty concerns human
conscience. 254 The argument is that free exercise of religion and the
admissibility of religious claims for exemptions could be adequately
ensured through freedom of conscience. 255 Non-principled substitution
249. Jim Dwyer, First Came Giuliani’s Input on the Immigration Order. Now
TIMES
(Feb.
9,
2017),
There’s
the
Court
Test,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/nyregion/rudolph-giuliani-donald-trumptravel-ban.html.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. See generally LABORDE, supra note 39; Michah Schwartzman, Religion
as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) (discussing the
“substitution” position).
253.
See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 223 (providing a deeper
philosophical account for the argument that religion has a substitute, like conscience);
Nickel, supra note 223 (purporting that religious freedom can be replaced by other
freedoms).
254. This article will not engage in the discussion about the different
conceptions of conscience. Neither will it discuss the argument that there is a
difference between human conscience and religious conscience. See Lund, supra note
223, at 503-04. For the argument that this article aims to develop, it is sufficient to
indicate that some liberal theorists of religious freedom argue that religion and
religious freedom have certain substitutes.
255. See JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM
OF CONSCIENCE 89 (2011) (arguing that given “the context of contemporary societies
marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves
that must enjoy a special status but rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to
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views basic liberties as being in practice enough to guarantee the free
exercise of religion. Thus, as Nickel has rightly asked: “who needs
freedom of religion,” when this right turns out to be superfluous? 256
i. Principled Substitution
Principled substitution says that religion is a subset of a broader
protection-worthy category: the conscience. 257 With reference to the
work of Roger Williams, Nussbaum argues:
The faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate
meaning of life is of intrinsic worth and value, and is worthy of
respect whether the person is using it well or badly. The faculty is
identified in part by what it does—it reasons, searches, and
experiences emotions of longing connected to that search—and in
part by its subject matter—it deals with ultimate questions, questions
of ultimate meaning. It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of
political respect, and thus we can agree to respect the faculty without
prejudicing the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or
what it might be like. From the respect we have for the person’s
conscience, that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we
ought to respect the space required by any activity that has the
general shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except
when that search violates the right of others or comes up against
some compelling state interest. 258

According to Nussbaum, this way of reasoning helps us “make
sense of our feeling that there really is something about religion or
quasi-religion that calls for special protection and delicacy.”259

structure their moral identity.”). See also LABORDE, supra note 39, at 66-67 (critical
of the position defended by Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor).
256. Nickel, supra note 223, at 943.
257. See also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 38 (rejecting the claim that
religion is a subset of human conscience and arguing that the latter is at best a
complement, not a substitute, for teleologically loaded terms such as religion).
258. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69.
259. Id. at 169 (arguing the search for meaningful answers to ultimate questions
of life helps us to keep our special solicitude for religion, as a matter of respect for a
broader human faculty, separated from “silly” faculties. That is to say, “faculties used
by my car lover, who isn’t engaged in a search for meaning, or the person who feels
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Specifically, this protection-worthy “something” is the human
conscience, which is an inalienable dignity people possess, regardless
of educational or socioeconomic background, health, religious belief,
and more. 260 Thus, there is no principled reason to single out religion
because it is religion. Rather, there is a principled argument to justify
the special protection of a broad liberty of conscience that encompasses
and protects the religious conscience as a matter of respect for human
dignity. 261 Accordingly, religious claims for exemptions are sometimes
granted “because they involve matters of conscience, not matters of
religion.” 262
ii. Non-Principled Substitution
Non-principled substitution seeks to invalidate the necessity of a
separate right to religious freedom. 263 Specifically, existing freedoms
of speech and association, and bans on discrimination and violence,
render a separate right unnecessary. 264 In other words: freedom of
religion has at least some very “adequate substitute[s].” 265 Arguments
that support the replacement of religious freedom consider this right
“dispensable,” 266 as other basic liberties ensure the free exercise of
religion. The argument suggests religious manifestations are related to
a broad range of areas, such as business, politics and association. Noncalled to dress like a chicken when going to work, which is (probably) just too silly to
count as a genuine search for meaning.”).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 164-74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 169, at 61-66; see generally
LEITER, supra note 56 (discussing the line that liberty of conscience is an appropriate
substitute for religious freedom). In the theoretical framework that Leiter uses to
develop his argument, principled substitution arises out of what the liberal concept of
toleration considers protection-worthy for principled reasons: equal liberty of
conscience.
262. LEITER, supra note 56, at 64.
263. See generally Nickel, supra note 223.
264. See generally Nickel, supra note 223, for a further discussion of this
position; see also Mark Tushnet, Redundant of Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L. J. 71, 73, 94 (2001). See generally Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and
Problems of Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L.
REV. 745 (2009).
265. Tushnet, supra note 264, at 94.
266. Nickel, supra note 223, at 941.
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principled substitution understands religious freedom in light of the
argument “that the sorts of activities it involves are covered by the most
important general liberties.” 267
Furthermore, non-principled substitution expects religious freedom
shares the same basis as other basic liberties. Thus, there is no reason
to think religion is something unique that could justify the special legal
solicitude toward religion qua religion. The expectation is that
understanding the need for the free exercise of religion in light of
existing basic liberties may eliminate the idea that religious beliefs are
privileged in society. Therefore, the granted exemptions are the
outcome of a proper application of basic liberties and not derived from
the presumed distinct value of religious beliefs. Lastly, the emphasis
on the protection of religious beliefs through the application of basic
liberties ensures people have a real choice to engage in or disapprove
certain convictions. 268
c. Generalization
Generalization advocates a broader, ecumenical and non-sectarian
definition of religion and religious freedom. Against this normative
backdrop, generalization defends the position that religious freedom
should not be considered a special right, which protects only a selected
group of people—the believers. 269 Rather, religious freedom should be
a general right to ethical and moral independence. 270 This position is
ecumenical because it looks beyond the sectarian theistic accounts of
religion. It is also non-sectarian because it does not bifurcate theistic
and non-theistic convictions about the good. 271 Generalization looks
beyond the narrow, theistic conception of “religion” and argues that
both God-believers and non-believers may be considered “religious,”
as both could have the same convictions about fundamental
questions. 272 In examining the deep commitment that religious and
267. Id. at 950.
268. Id. at 943-50.
269. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132 (discussing religious freedom as a general
right to ethical independence); see also Perry, supra note 64, at 996 (stating how
broadening religious freedom will encompass moral freedom).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5.
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non-religious people share, the generalist position sees an “intrinsic and
inescapable ethical responsibility” to succeed in life. 273 Accordingly,
this position says religious freedom should be the general right to
ethical independence that opens the doors to moral freedom. 274
Under the generalist framework, religious freedom is the right that
gives humans full access to ethical independence. 275 Thus, the
generalist account of religious freedom emphasizes the opportunities
for individuals to make independent life decisions based on their deeply
held ethical commitments. This approach apparently extends the
definition of religion. 276 The main justification for this extension is
rooted in the idea that we need a deeper, non-sectarian understanding
of religious freedom because the free exercise of religion cannot be
protected on sectarian grounds for distinctly religious reasons. 277 The
leading normative argument behind generalization’s core tenets—
religious beliefs as deep ethical commitments and religious freedom as
a general right to moral and ethical independence—is the assumption
that public authorities are not apt to judge what should count as moral
or religious truth. 278
273. Id. at 114. See also James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court:
Tillich’s Ultimate Concern as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH &
ST. 245, 260 (1988) (discussing Paul Tillich’s idea of “ultimate concerns” that
scholars have used to interpret religion beyond its theistic definition). Many thanks
to Christy Green for the suggestion to have a look at Paul Tillich’s discussion of
“ultimate concerns.”
274. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 129-30.
275. Id. at 132.
276. See Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22. A serious concern of this
“symmetrical theory” of religious freedom—on both sides (public justification and
religious accommodation) religion is not something special—is the huge risk of
anarchy. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 117; LEITER, supra note 56, at
95; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 173 (drawing attention to the side-constraints of
an all-inclusive term religion).
277. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 17, 129. See generally Matthew Clayton, Is
Ethical Independence Enough?, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 132
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon Eds.) (2017) (a recent defense of Dworkin’s
approach to religious freedom).
278. Perry, supra note 64, at 1012. This concerns a Lockean criticism on
governmental interference in matters of morality and religion. Locke states that the
main purpose of the law “is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety
and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods and person.”
Id. at 1003.
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Understanding religion in terms of access to ethical independence
pursues an ideal of liberal neutrality, 279 toward what Nussbaum has
called, the “ultimate questions” of life. 280 The call for liberal neutrality
toward deep human commitments is bolstered by the crux of ethical
independence, which “requires that government not restrict citizens’
freedom when its justification assumes that one concept of how to live,
or what makes a successful life, is superior to others. It is often an
interpretive question, and sometimes a difficult one, whether a policy
does reflect that assumption.” 281 To clarify why we should endorse
liberal neutrality as a matter of principle, the generalist position divides
basic liberties into special and general rights. The difference between
these two variants is rooted in what the threshold authorities must cross
when they aim to restrict a right. Special rights focus on a particular
“subject matter” and it is complicated to limit these rights legitimately,
except in cases of emergency. General rights, on the other hand, focus
on the relation between authorities and people. General rights restrict
the scope of arguments authorities can provide to legitimately limit the
exercise of a general right. 282
The specific distinction between general (restrict arguments to limit
free exercise) and special (focus is on a protection-worthy subject)
rights gives generalists a reason to argue that religious freedom should
be a general right, as the category of “religion” remains a complicated
subject to interpret. Thus, the definition problem of religion, which the
generalists posit is intertwined with freedom of religion, is an important
argument to oppose granting religious freedom a special status. That is
to say, considering religious freedom a special right. The semantic
criticism at this point conveys that a special right would explicitly focus

279. Cécile Laborde, Dworkin’s Freedom of Religion Without God, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 125, 125 (2014).
280. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168.
281. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 141-42.
282. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 132-33 (stating that “a special right of religion
declares that government must not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an
extraordinary emergency. The general right to ethical independence, on the
contrary . . . limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a citizen’s
freedom at all.”).
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on the definition of religion and it would not be able to solve the
definition problem of this right. 283
Furthermore, a special right requires high demands on restrictions
that aim to limit the exercise of such a right. Instead, the generalist
position argues that approaching religious freedom as a general right to
ethical independence will provide protection to the free exercise of
religion. The generalist position explains that the right to ethical
independence “condemns any explicit discrimination . . . that
assumes . . . that one variety of religious faith is superior to others in
truth or virtue or that a political majority is entitled to favor one faith
over others or that atheism is father to immorality.” 284 Moreover, it
“protects religious conviction in a more subtle way as well: by
outlawing any constraint neutral on its face but whose design covertly
However,
assumes some direct or indirect subordination.” 285
understanding religious freedom as a general right to ethical
independence might force people to adjust their religious conduct in a
way that conforms to laws that are not per se catered to them. 286
Therefore, the generalist position argues that authorities should take
into account whether restrictions on a particular practice they propose
are in fact targeting what one group might consider “a sacred duty.” 287
If so, “then the legislature must consider whether equal concern . . .
requires an exemption or other amelioration. If an exception can be
managed with no significant damage to the policy in play, then it might
be unreasonable not to grant that exception.” 288

283. Id.; see generally LABORDE, supra note 39, at 30-33; SULLIVAN, supra
note 223, at 1-4 (discussing the problem of defining religion).
284. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 133-34.
285. Id. at 134.
286. Ronald Dworkin stated, “[i]f we deny a special right to free exercise of
religious practice, and rely only on the general right to ethical independence, then
religions may be forced to restrict their practices so as to obey rational, nondiscriminatory laws that do not display less than equal concern for them.” Id. at 13536.
287. Id. at 136.
288. Id.
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d. Equation
Equation requires equal respect for all deep concerns of people. In
effect, religious beliefs and practices of one group of citizens, as they
relate to deep human concerns, should not be favored over similar deep
concerns of others. Religious freedom should ensure this equal
treatment of people. 289 Against this backdrop, equation opposes
arguments that justify religious freedom in light of any “distinct value”
of religious manifestations.
Rather, it argues that believers’
vulnerability to discrimination should be considered the main
justification for religious freedom. In addition, equation opposes a
“religious” understanding of religious freedom. In this sense, equation
is very close to generalization. However, there are two main
differences. First, it is not indifference or neutrality as such that
requires principled equation. 290 Rather, it is the ideal of equality of
treatment of all acts and thoughts that have an intrinsic value.291
Second, equation does not generalize religious freedom to something
like the general right to ethical independence and moral freedom. 292
Instead, equation approaches religious freedom from the principle of
equality of treatment, which is considered the main constitutional value
of a liberal democracy. 293 Therefore, the equation approach is part of

289. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What
Religion Is? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 834-35 (2009) (stating that “the point of
the Religion Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the value of religious practices, any
more than the point of the Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag
burning.”).
290. See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 493, 496-97, 520 (2009).
291. See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal
Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, at 352 (2010) (arguing that
some liberal theorists of religious freedom have “[attacked] religious exemptions on
the general premise that they are fundamentally unfair to nonreligious people.”).
292. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, 51-77 (2007); see generally
LABORDE, supra note 39, at 55-57; Lund, supra note 291, at 360 (critical of the theory
developed by Eisgruber and Sager). See also Boyce, supra note 290, at 496-97
(differentiating between equality in treatment and equality in effect).
293. See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 19.
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what has been called the egalitarian theories of religious freedom. 294
The question is, however, equation of what? 295 At the outset, this
position is anti-favoritism, 296 as it advocates equal treatment of all
conscientious manifestations and beliefs that contain an intrinsic
value. 297
Equation “requires simply that government treat[s] the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally.” 298 Thus, there are no principled reasons to differentiate
between deep human commitments. The norm should be an equal
approach to non-religious and religious perspectives on the ultimate
questions of life. The equation approach rethinks religious freedom as
“the right of the individual . . . to life outside the state—the right to live
as a self on which many given, as well as chosen, demands are made.
Such a right may not be best realized through laws guaranteeing
religious freedom but by laws guaranteeing equality.” 299 Thus, the
regime of religious toleration should be understood against the
backdrop of human vulnerability to discrimination. Eisgruber and
Sager states:
[what] properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious
practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their
distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection against
discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental
concerns. When we have replaced value with vulnerability, and the
paradigm of privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible
both to make sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart
an appealing constitutional future. 300

294. See Cécile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion and the Good?, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 249 (Jean Louise Cohen
& Cécile Laborde Eds., 2016) (discussing egalitarian theories of religious freedom).
295. See LABORDE, supra note 39, at 89.
296. SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 149; see also LABORDE, supra note 39, at
42.
297. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 223, at 51-77; LABORDE, supra note 39,
at 51.
298. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1283.
299. SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159.
300. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 1248.
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This position allows us to accept two main differences between
generalization and equation. In short, generalization focuses on how
we should understand religious freedom as a liberty and equation
approaches religious freedom from the ideal of equality.
e. Representation
Representation’s main claim is that a single group should not have
exclusive protections that are not afforded to other groups. Hence, it is
not a sectarian theory of religious freedom. Representation is rooted,
as Laborde says, “in the ecumenical value of ethical integrity, and in
the normative justifications for generic liberal rights such as speech and
association.” 301 Representation views religion as a concept that stands
for a set of protection-worthy values that are not necessarily “religious”
at the core. 302 These values justify the codification of a special right to
religious freedom. 303 As such, religion, like respect, stands for a
“hypergood”—a particular category of higher goods. 304 Koppelman
argues that:
[religion] . . . has a value that can override many other goods and
preferences. But religion is one among many hypergoods. It should
not be privileged over the rest of them. This fundamental problem
of modernity should not be adjudicated by the state. The problem of
determining the appropriate hypergood, if any, and its reconciliation
with the broad range of ordinary goods, is a question that occupies
the same existential territory as religion. If the state is incompetent

301. The position this article qualifies as “representation” elaborates on the
“proxy” and “disaggregation” approaches. See LABORDE & BARDON, supra note 39,
at 599-600.
302. See generally Ronan McCrea, The Consequences of Disaggregation and
the Impossibility of a Third Way, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 69
(Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017) (criticizing Laborde’s disaggregation
approach).
303. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 332 (2001).
304. Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 594 (2006).
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to resolve religious questions, it is likewise incompetent to resolve
this one. 305

To identify the relevant legal values of religion, the representation
position reflects on the potential matches between the “different parts
of the law” and “different dimensions of religion for the protection of
different normative values.” 306 Examples of such matches are: the
presentation of religion as a conception of the good life; a conscientious
moral obligation; the key feature of identity; mode of human
association; a vulnerability class; a totalizing institution; and an
inaccessible doctrine. 307 Specifically, matches such as the presentation
of religion as a conception of the good life, a matter of conscience,
identity and association, are more “relevant to the notion of freedom of
religion” than other overlapping areas. 308 Hence, representation could
be defined as “religion-blind without being religion-insensitive,
because it sees religion, not as a specialised and self-contained area of
human belief and activity, but as a richly diverse expression of life
itself.” 309
B. Religious Freedom: Abstraction from the Religious Dimension
Does religion qua religion deserve special legal protection? At the
outset, there is no right or wrong answer to this question. At most,
classifying different positions is instructive for mapping the main
arguments to explore alternative methods. Also, classifying normative
approaches is helpful when examining the theoretical differences of the
305. Id. In his later publications, Andrew Koppelman has elaborated on
considering religion a legal proxy. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise
Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 981 (2010)
(stating “it is not possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good for. Like
a knife or a rock, it is something that people find already existing in the world, which
they then put to a huge variety of uses. Religion denotes a cluster of goods.”). This
position has been defended more recently in KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 124. See
also Koppelman, supra note 242, at 36-37 (repeating the view that religion
encompasses many goods that people aim to purse and religious freedom enables them
to do that).
306. Laborde, supra note 226, at 594.
307. Id. at 594-95.
308. Id. at 595-97.
309. Id. at 600.
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liberal theories of religious freedom. Moreover, mapping out
differences streamlines the process of finding an element of
commonality between the theories. The similarities between the
responses reveal two potential categories. First, a “strong rejectionist
response.” Second, a “soft rejectionist response.” The strong
rejectionist response posits that religion should not be considered a
special protection-worthy category in law. This position corresponds
with the rejectionist position. The softer response also rejects the
position that religion is special qua religion in law—entailing that the
liberal substitutes of religion make this category possibly protection
worthy. Therefore, religion is only special through substitution,
generalization, equation, and representation. Does this twofold
response about religion’s specialness provide us with a binding
commonality between all liberal theories of religious freedom? It does.
The underlying message supporting both categories of responses is
that distinctly religious values are not enough to justify the special legal
solicitude toward religion. Thus, both responses reject the specialness
of the metaphysics of religion for the special legal solitude toward
religion. The synthesis of the twofold response is the dismissal of the
special legal protection of religion qua religion. Moreover, this
synthesis renounces arguments that justify religious freedom with an
appeal to any distinct value of religion. What clarifies and justifies the
special legal attention for religion is a broader and apparently religionempty (i.e., free from distinctly religious values) framework of
faculties, liberties, and vulnerabilities. 310
The question is, what does this predominantly negative answer to
the question of whether religion qua religion requires special legal
protection suggest about the binding feature of the liberal theories of
religious freedom? Can we claim that the twofold response that we
have given is an illustration of “decoupling religion from a god?”311
Alternatively, does the synthesis of our twofold response fit the

310. LABORDE, supra note 39, at 42 (criticizing the “vague” broader framework
that is adopted by egalitarian theorists of religious freedom to justify the special legal
solicitude toward religion).
311. DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 132 (stating that “the problems we
encountered in defining freedom of religion flow from trying to retain that right as a
special right while also decoupling religion from a god.”).
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“tendency, among legal practitioners, to re-describe” religious matters
in non-religious terms? 312
The synthesis of our negative response encompasses both
hypothetical questions when it reacts to the justification grounds of the
special legal solicitude toward religion. It decouples religion from any
God. Essentially, it presents religion as one subcategory in the more
general and apparently non-religious categories of human conscience
and the conceptions of the good life. It decouples religion from any
God in a further sense. The twofold response conceptualizes religion
in a God-empty way, free from distinctly religious values. For example,
the definition of religion states that it is the combination of categorical
demands that are insulated from evidence and reason. 313 Other Godempty conceptions of religion are concerned with the identification of
general and apparently non-religious values that are worthy of legal
protection. Examples of such intrinsic and valuable aspects of religion
include: the values behind human conscience, 314 ethical integrity, 315

312. Laborde, supra note 226, at 590 (arguing that “there has been a tendency,
among legal practitioners, to re-describe [particular religious] practices in the
language of conscientious obligation, so as to accommodate them under the label of
freedom of religion.”).
313. LEITER, supra note 56, at 33-34. Koppelman is critical of Brian Leiter’s
conception of religion, referring to it as “a radically impoverished conception.”
Koppelman, supra note 305, at 962; see also McConnell, supra note 226, at 784
(suggesting, “it is futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion and only
of religion. What makes religion distinctive is its unique combination of features, as
well as the place it holds in real human lives and human history.”) See also François
Boucher & Cécile Laborde, Why Tolerate Conscience?, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 493, 496
(2016) (stating that “Leiter fails to establish insulation from reasons and evidence as
the demarcating feature of religion. This is because he draws on incompatible
interpretations of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’ to reply to different
challenges regarding either the under-inclusiveness or the over-inclusiveness of his
definition of religion.”).
314. NUSSBAUM, supra note 223, at 168-69. But see KOPPELMAN, supra note
223, at 153 (arguing that “[it] is not clear how Nussbaum can maintain the distinction
between her position and a libertarian view in which any regulation of anyone’s
conduct is presumptively invalid . . . . [As such], [t]he boundaries of protection in
Nussbaum are thus uncertain.”). See also Laborde, supra note 226, at 589 (arguing
that the substitution position is not able to provide equal protection to all religious
practices that are valuable, though not always on conscientious grounds).
315. Laborde, supra note 226, at 589.
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deep ethical commitments, 316 hope and vulnerability to injustice. 317
These valuable—though not specifically or distinctly religious—
aspects of religion justify the special legal protection of religious beliefs
and manifestations.
The synthesis of our twofold response fits the tendency of redescription, which suggests that in analyzing the legal aspects of a
religious manifestation case, it is neither necessary nor useful to define
or understand that case in distinct religious terms. The tendency of redescription arises from projects that aim to rethink religious freedom in
a religion-empty way, protecting both theistic and non-theistic beliefs
and manifestations. The normative argument is that both theistic and
non-theistic beliefs and manifestations with an intrinsic value, which
attaches to valuable aspects of a human life, should be treated with the
same amount of respect and concern. As such, religious freedom has
been rethought, approached and defended as: the liberty of
conscience, 318 the right to moral freedom, 319 the right to ethical
independence, and the citizens’ equal right to live outside the state. 320
Thus far, we have argued that the synthesis of our twofold response
decouples religion from any God and relies mainly on non-religious
language to re-describe religious matters. 321 The question is whether
we could provide a more coherent description of our synthesis,
encompassing both the decoupling and re-description aspect of the
debate in jurisprudence about law and religion. In other words, is it
possible to systematically identify and subsequently define the feature
that serves as the binding characteristic of the liberal theories of
religious freedom? This feature looks beyond the varieties of normative

316. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 5.
317. KOPPELMAN, supra note 223, at 122 (discussing hope); Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 20, at 1248 (discussing the vulnerability to injustice).
318. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 89; NUSSBAUM, supra note 223,
at 169.
319. Perry, supra note 64, at 996.
320. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 130 (on the right to ethical independence);
SULLIVAN, supra note 223, at 159 (on the right to live outside the state).
321. Cf. Peter Jones, Religious Exemptions and Distributive Justice, in
RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 163 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon
eds., 2017) (explaining that the non-religious description of religious exemptions,
such as the use of a cultural frame, fits the egalitarian strategy to defend religious
exemptions on non-sectarian grounds).
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positions and connects these perspectives through a common focus—
the justification grounds for the special legal protection of religion.
With this presumption in mind, the starting point in identifying the
potential binding element of the liberal theories of religious freedom is
the interpretative concern about the proper legal definition of religion
and religious freedom and the definition’s fair application in practice.
This interpretative concern guides us to define the binding
characteristic of the liberal theories of religious freedom. First, we have
seen that these theories aim to provide the most appropriate definition
of religion in law. Second, they have one important concern: the
egalitarian attention to fair treatment of deep human commitments and
beliefs.
Hence, the binding characteristic is a normative response to the
question: how should liberal democracies understand and accordingly
deal with the concept of religion in law? This binding element
encompasses the entire body of arguments that paves the way for
balancing religion’s role in law as it relates to the paradigm of liberal
political philosophy. The binding characteristic takes the form of an
interpretative shield. It is embedded in philosophical arguments that
can resist the justification of religious freedom with an appeal to
distinctly religious values. In addition, it draws on a non-sectarian
language to conceptualize religion and religious manifestations.
What does this interpretative shield suggest about the binding
feature of the liberal theories of religious freedom? Does it help provide
a more coherent definition of our synthesis that covers the decoupling
and the re-description aspects of the law and religion debate in
jurisprudence? Yes, it does. The negative answer to the question as to
whether religion qua religion requires special legal protection stands
for abstraction from the religious dimension. The abstraction theory
entails that religion does not deserve special protection in law qua
religion. Religion receives only a special treatment through abstraction,
meaning through the non-sectarian, protection-worthy categories that
serve as proper liberal substitutes for the category of religion. This is
due to the egalitarian approach of religious freedom’s liberal theories
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to theistic and non-theistic beliefs and the emphasis of these theories on
neutrality toward any particular worldview. 322
Abstraction manifests itself by refusing to justify religious freedom
through appeals to religious values, thus rejecting the toleration of
religion qua religion. Moreover, it also refuses to justify free exercise
by appealing to a more general framework of values that are not theistic
per se. Even more, abstraction insists that justifications for religious
exceptions, like for any other type of legal exception, need to be
ecumenical. 323
As with ritual dietary restrictions, the liberal argument suggests
exemptions are granted not because of any religious narrative, but
because of the commitment to respect the human conscience equally. 324
The abstraction theory unveils that within the liberal paradigm of
political philosophy, religious freedom is in fact a euphemism for
abstraction from the religious dimension. As such, abstraction is not
about the empirical argument concerning the specialness of religion.
Rather, abstraction covers the complete body of conceptual and
normative arguments that either strongly (rejection) or less strongly
(substitution, generalization, equation and representation) oppose to the
empirical reality in liberal democracies that treats religion as special
qua religion.
However, the abstraction theory provides two ways to understand
the law and religious scholarship within the paradigm of liberal political
philosophy. First, the metaphysics of religion are not considered
special—this has a legal explanation. The abstraction argument
suggests that law always abstracts from a particular perspective toward
a more general perspective. Second, religion is not a special protectionworthy category in law qua religion. Liberal theories of religious
freedom strongly oppose favoritism of religious beliefs and practices,
and abstraction is an ideological tool to equalize beliefs and
experiences.
322. Laborde, supra note 294, at 249 (for a discussion of the egalitarian theories
of religious freedom). There is also a legal explanation for the phenomenon of
abstraction, however that is beyond the scope of this article.
323. Ecumenical, here, is not in the religious meaning of the word, but rather
in the sense of being widely accessible to a broad public, and not because of the quality
of people’s beliefs but simply because they are human beings who share certain
important features, such as the conscience.
324. Cf. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 255, at 77.
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C. Abstraction and “Living Together”
Abstraction and “Living Together” directs our attention back to
S.A.S., the recommendations of the EU Parliament, the “reconciliation
strategy” and the reinforcement of majoritarianism.
Is the
“reconciliation strategy” a paradigmatic expression of recent
developments in legal theory and liberal political philosophy about
religion’s role in justifying accommodation and decisions in law and
politics? In other words, does the abstraction theory help us to reconcile
diversity with majoritarian sensitivities under critical scrutiny? It does.
The abstraction theory, with its emphasis on the use of religiously
neutral or religion-empty language in discussions concerning the
lawfulness of contentious religious manifestations helps us discuss the
outcome of S.A.S. in light of the most recent theoretical developments
in the field of liberal political philosophy. On the one hand, presenting
an extant religious manifestation (such as face-covering veils) as a
matter of gender-equality, human dignity, and “living together” fits the
non-sectarian approach of abstraction. Indeed, the abstraction theory
does not support any legal discussion of religious practices from a
sectarian perspective, meaning an exclusively religious view. In other
words, the use of that language fits the tendency of “re-describing”
extant religious manifestation in non-religious terms. That is not
problematic per se. But the Travel Ban case has shown that such a
facially neutral language does not help to vanish its history of animus
toward Muslims. 325
Furthermore, reinforcing the argument that particular lifestyles are
not welcome might pose a serious danger to the egalitarian defense of
religious freedoms. The abstraction theory has unveiled the notion that
liberal theories of religious freedom strongly oppose favoring or
disfavoring a particular lifestyle because of the specific narratives
behind that lifestyle. 326 Nevertheless, the empirical argument suggests
something else.

325. Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual Invasion: Past as Prologue in
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 389 (2018)
(on file with author) (rightly pointing out that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric during
the Presidential campaign, was more than a slip of the tongue).
326. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 30 at 130; Perry, supra note 64 (both arguing
that the state should not prescribe how people should live their lives).
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Over the past few years, particularly over the last decade and in the
aftermath of terrorist attacks that are linked to radicalized Islamic
groups, a growing number of liberal democracies have developed
monitoring policies that single out Muslims and Muslim organizations
for special bans. 327 The arguments used to defend these types of
prohibitions are similar: defending the neutrality of the state, avoiding
radicalization, and combatting life styles that are contrary to Western
norms. The latter objective challenges us to think about the
compatibility of these special bans with the standards of liberal political
philosophy that has shaped the contours of modern liberal democracies.
Within this liberal paradigm of political thought, the state should refrain
from favoring or disfavoring particular lifestyles. As a result, the recent
prohibitions targeting Muslims across liberal democracies for their
norm deviant behavior violates the favored egalitarian understanding of
religious freedom. Hence, the endorsement of living together and the
reinforcement of majoritarianism are both paradigmatic expressions of
the shifts toward ethnocentrism that is little tolerant of non-mainstream
ideas and practices.
III. THE PRAGMATIC DEFENSE
The reinforcement of majoritarianism results in the creation of the
“good religion,” which is adopted by the vast majority. Subsequently,
“bad religions” are outlawed by making diversity and religious plurality
majoritarian-proof. The outcome is the establishment of a “State’s
Religion,” which clearly admires the category of good religions of the
dominant majority. These are basically religious practices and beliefs
that fit the state’s agenda of how citizens should live their lives. Hence,
practices and beliefs that do not fall within the category of good
327. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, Lives and Lies
That Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455 (2017) (on the anti-Muslim agenda of President
Trump); Mark C. Rahdert, Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American
Resistance to Foreign Law, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 537, 558 (2016) (critical of singling
out Sharia law qua Sharia for a special ban); Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—
How Islamophobia is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 1027 (2012) (on how anti-Muslim initiatives reinforce disparities); Jennifer
Heider, Unveiling the Truth behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted
Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human
Rights, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93 (2012) (on file with author) (on the rise of
Islamophobia and how this affects the fundamental rights of Muslims).
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religions are banned, restricted, or labeled as “unwelcome.” The
question is: are we able to develop argumentation patterns that help us
refrain from this dangerous path, while remaining aware of the security
threats some beliefs pose to the core ideals of a liberal democracy? Is
it possible to rethink religious freedom in a way that is more “diversityfriendly” and compatible with the egalitarian understating of this right
that rejects religious toleration qua religious? How can we develop
argumentation patterns that would fit a broad sense of justice when we
talk about religious freedom? Reflecting on the implications potential
bans would have on extant religious practices, internally and externally,
is a helpful first exercise to develop the sort arguments needed to defend
religious freedom beyond the sectarian justification of this right.
A. The Anti-Alienation Argument
To explain this argument we need to think about a real threat to a
particular religious manifestation. The potential ban on ritual infant
male circumcision (“MC”) is an appropriate example. Although, this
practice has not been outlawed yet, a few “exceptional judgments”
mirror the growing public outcry across Western countries to stop MC.
These decisions consider the current legal approach to MC as contrary
to the child’s best interests. The argument is that given the high health
risks of MC, such as the risk of developing sexual and mental health
problems, the non-therapeutic ritual circumcision of boys should be
postponed until the child is of an age that he can competently consent
to the procedure. 328 The most outspoken court ruling embracing this
line of reasoning is the 2012 German Cologne Landgericht ruling. 329 A
similar decision was reached a few years earlier in Finland, 330 and in

328. Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 439,
440-41 (2013).
329. The court ruled that parents’ right to religious freedom—in general—does
not justify MC, if the intervention is not medically required. The child should have
the opportunity to decide himself about the status of his foreskin. See also Bijan
Fateh-Moghadam, Criminalizing Male Circumcision, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1131 (2012).
330. The Tampere District Court held that religious freedom does not justify
the violation of bodily integrity. The court referred to the ban on female circumcision
and argued that toleration of male circumcision would result in discrimination. See
generally Heli Askola, Cut-Off Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland, 25
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 100 (2011).
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Iceland a bill to completely ban ritual male circumcision was
designed. 331
Reflecting on the implications of a potential ban on ritual male
circumcision would have internally, we can argue that such a total ban
would give Jews and Muslims the impression that they do not enjoy
equal respect from authorities. This argument finds support in scholarly
works that have found how anti-Sharia legal initiatives in the United
States, such as the “Save our State” Amendment, have put Muslim
communities at risk of isolation and alienation. 332 Therefore, liberal
democracies need to encourage mutual understanding between different
groups of citizens. This “anti-alienation” argument helps maintain the
legal status quo of ritual male circumcision, not because of its sectarian
nature, but rather because a total ban on this practice could further
alienate marginalized groups that attach great importance to ritual male
circumcision. 333
331. Harriet Sherwood, Iceland law to outlaw male circumcision sparks row
(Feb.
18,
2018),
over
religious
freedom,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/iceland-ban-male-circumcisionfirst-european-country.
332. Ali, supra note 327, at 1031. See also Ross Johnson, A Monolithic Threat:
The anti-Sharia Movement and America’s Counter-Subversive Tradition, 19 WASH.
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 183, 218 (2012).
333. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND
BELIEF ON HIS MISSION TO DENMARK (2016). Interestingly enough, the enormous and
global sensitivity about a potential ban regarding male circumcision is completely
absent in the area of female circumcision. On the contrary, many countries around
the globe have decided to eliminate this practice by either using standard laws banning
assault and other types of physical harm or developing special bans on female
circumcision. See Renée Kool & Sohail Wahedi, European Models of Citizenship
and the Fight against Female Genital Mutilation, in DEVELOPMENT AND THE
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 205-221 (Scott Nicholas Romaniuk & Marguerite
Marlin Eds., 2015) (on file with author). See also Saul Levmore, Can Wrinkles be
Glamorous? in SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, AGING THOUGHTFULLY:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES, AND REGRET 104-05
(2017) (saying “the fact that so many thoughtful people find female but not male
circumcision abhorrent, suggests that a critical difference is that one is practiced on a
group that is, at least to Western eyes, seriously constrained and subjugated by a
variety of practices.”); see generally Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, Essay:
Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1998). On the presence of double standards in this context,
see Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Hands off My Pudendum: A Critique of the Human Rights
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B. The Wrong-Signal Argument
Next to the anti-alienation argument, we can also reflect on the
external effects of a ban on ritual male circumcision. The question is:
what implications would a ban on ritual male circumcision have for the
foreign policies of liberal democracies? Such policies are, among other
matters, concerned with the protection of the rights of non-believers,
atheists, proselytes, and critics of religion in countries that lack
fundamental rights, such as the freedoms of speech, conscience, and
association. 334 Notably, religious freedom is within the human rights
discourse understood as the right to believe, to not believe, to change
religion, and to be able to criticize religion. Therefore, a complete ban
on ritual male circumcision, which has also been practiced in countries
that do not have a strong human rights record, would further complicate
and narrow our possibilities when asking to direct attention to the rights
of vulnerable groups around the globe. In other words, such a policy
would send the wrong signal about religion and related freedoms. 335
This “wrong signal” argument accepts that within liberal
democracies, religious freedom has no intrinsic liberal value. It
understands this freedom as a religion-empty liberty that provides
protection to a wide range of beliefs and practices, without making a
distinction between the theistic and non-theistic beliefs people may
have. However, in line with the political commitment to draw attention
to the human rights situation of vulnerable groups, 336 in countries that
lack religious freedom, we would benefit from this freedom to raise
awareness about the deplorable human rights situation of vulnerable
groups. We need to draw attention to the insecurity threatening these
Approach to Female Genital Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 243, 253 (2011)
(pointing out that a traditional practice like female circumcision is generally
associated with harm and mutilation, while similar harsh language is absent from the
discussion on cosmetic interventions upon female bodies).
334. The European Union has even a Special Envoy, Ján Figel, former Slovak
diplomat, who promotes religious freedom as part of the European Union’s foreign
policy. See also Ján Figel, The European Union and Freedom of Religion or Belief:
A New Momentum, 2017 BYU L. REV. 895 (2017). Cf. Jeremy Patrick, Religion and
New Constitutions: Recent Trends of Harmony and Divergence, 44 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 903 (2013).
335. Cf. Yusuf, supra note 69, at 293.
336. Vulnerable groups, in this context, include: atheists, adherents of new
religions, and critics of religion.
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vulnerable groups in countries that do not recognize the right to
religious freedom. Therefore, any serious restriction—such as a total
ban on important religious practices like ritual male circumcision
(relevant for many Muslims and Jews)—creates a complex situation for
liberal democracies. 337
C. The Non-Sectarian Liberal Defense of Religious Liberty
Although the pragmatic arguments help us to oppose a complete
ban on MC and a toleration regime for FC, they are not the similar to
principled arguments that criticize the ban on face-covering dresses and
the proposed closure of mosques by the EU Parliament. Opposing
restrictions on the latter category of religious manifestations draws on
matters related to liberties of conscience, expression, and association.
The theory of abstraction from the religious dimension, with its
emphasis on the egalitarian and non-sectarian understanding of
religious freedom, provides principled arguments to oppose measures
that unfairly restrict ways of life that are not favored by the majority.
Meaning, that the pragmatic defense of religious freedom based on the
“anti-alienation” and “wrong signal” arguments is not principled in
nature. This defense does not convincingly debunk the liberal rejection
(the “strong rejectionist response”) and substitution (the “soft
rejectionist response”) criticism. However, for the time being, it
provides arguments that explain why we should be aware of imposing
restrictions upon certain extant religious manifestations. The case of
ritual circumcision reveals that any total ban on ritual male
circumcision would call for both internal and external resistance.
Hence, the pragmatic arguments warn us for the implications of a ban
internally and externally. This reflection is a helpful exercise for
developing a theory of religious freedom that endorses diversity for
pragmatic reasons.
337. We may also find support for this argument in Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2424, “The First Amendment
prohibits the establishment of religion and promises the free exercise of religion.
From these safeguards, and from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows there
is freedom of belief and expression. It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to
these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of
foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed
always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom
extends outward, and lasts.” (emphasis added).
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However, there is something very crucial about the relationship
between abstraction and the non-sectarian liberal defense of religious
liberty. What we should clearly dispatch, is the idea that the theory of
abstraction—with its talent to undo religious practices from a religious
angle, is effectively an open invitation to disregard fundamental rights
of people. Denying them the right to manifest or even have their own
beliefs, and declaring them and religious accommodation at war.
Liberal political philosophy has a dichotomous relationship with
religion. On the one hand it contends that religion qua religion should
not be singled out for a special, or favored, treatment in law. Hence, no
religious freedom simply because religion is special. On the other hand,
liberal political philosophy includes many arguments we could rely on
to say that religion qua religion should not be singled out for a special
disfavored treatment in law. 338 This is because of the reasons liberal
political philosophy generally gives to object a legal protection regime
for religion qua religion.
This rejection is laid down in an egalitarian approach to questions
of accommodation. However, egalitarianism in this context does not
imply that religious people should be deprived from the right to
manifest their beliefs. Egalitarianism, in relation to religious
accommodation, challenges the legal protection regime, asking if there
is anything special about religion that warrants a special and favored
treatment of religion qua religion. Admittedly, it answers this question
negatively. But it provides via abstraction a wide range of grounds and
substitutes on which the toleration regime for religious accommodation
can continue. It continues, not because it involves religion, but, for
example, because of conscience and the high importance it attaches to
the protection hereof. 339

338. Cf. the “inclusive non-accommodation” theory of religious freedom, as
discussed by Micah Schwartzman. The inclusiveness of this theory is related to the
public justification debate (on the “specialness” of religion for the purpose of
justifying public decisions), implying that religion is not something special for the
justification of legal and political decisions. Thus, no limitation on adding religion to
the body of categories that can be used by legal and political authorities to justify their
decisions. Similarly, religion is not special for the accommodation question: religions
and non-religions should be treated equally by granting exemptions. See
Schwartzman, supra note 38, at 22.
339. Wahedi, supra note 54.
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This egalitarian challenge to religious accommodation does not
only help us critically revisit the protection regime for a wide range of
religious practices. It also helps us to dismantle and uncover double
standards behind plans that target religion, either in an implicit way or
a clear showing of animus toward religion. Hence, the egalitarian
perspective—with its focus on the non-sectarian substitutes of
religion—helps us to challenge facially neutral grounds that effectively
challenge the lawfulness of religious manifestations or target the
adherents of a particular religion. 340
Since singling out religion qua religion for special legal protection
is problematic, it is equally troublesome to single out religion qua
religion for special prohibitions. To put it differently, neither sectarian
grounds nor grounds evincing animosity toward religion should be
considered decisive for granting exemptions or issuing bans. Both are
equally objectionable. This point can be illustrated in light of the
problematic cases we have discussed in this article and by asking
ourselves the following two questions. First, does the action attest to
singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored treatment? Second,
would we have been able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious
freedom?
Let’s begin with The Austrian “Islam bill.” Does the ban for
Islamic organizations and houses of worship on receiving foreign
founding attest to singling out religion qua religion for a disfavored
treatment? It does. Other religious groups do not face similar
restrictions. Hence, this may point to the presence of double standards
in dealing with religious radicalization, the facially neutral ground the
restriction rests on. But, would we have been able to scrutinize this
action in absence of religious freedom? Yes. The limitations it poses
on the freedom of association and the opportunities to have equal access
to, for example, crowdfunding actions, would help us argue that the
Austrian bill is wrong, apart from the fact that it implies a double
standard. Both the substitution and the equation approach would help
us at this point to challenge the legality of the Austrian “Islam bill.”
Next, let’s review the French ban on face-covering dresses. Does
the French Prohibition Law attest to singling out religion qua religion
for a disfavored treatment? It does. The notorious history of this ban
340. See generally Sohail Wahedi, Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration
Politics of the United States, CAL. W. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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contains many indications revealing this ban was initiated as a response
to Islamic manifestations in public. 341 The exceptions it contains, for
example, for those who cover their faces to participate in traditional and
artistic events, reinforce the suspicion that the ban effectively singled
out an Islamic practice qua Islamic. Would we in any way have been
able to scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom? Yes. We
would have approached this ban, for example, as contradictory to
freedom of conscience, as the women who cover their faces are
deprived from the right to live in accordance with their deepest
convictions, without posing serious harm to other people or the society
as a whole. Hence, the substitution approach to religion and the
generalization approach to religious freedom, rethink this right as the
right to ethical independence and helps us to put the ban under critical
scrutiny.
Our next illustration is the Travel Ban of President Trump. Does
the enactment of travel restrictions for people coming from Muslim
majority countries attest to singling out religion qua religion for a
disfavored treatment? It does. The issuance of the Travel Ban
incarnated the promise of Republican Party’s Candidate Trump to close
all the U.S. borders to Muslims.342 But, would we have been able to
scrutinize this action in absence of religious freedom? Yes. The Travel
Ban—lacking a profound justification for the choice of targeted
nations—is an obvious example of discrimination based on nationality.
Furthermore, the fact that the Ban mainly targets Muslims—or people
coming from Muslim majority countries—makes it possible to posit
that it is clearly against the freedom of expression, as it hinders people
to pursue their path of beliefs. The equation and the substitution
approaches would help us to further challenge the Travel Ban in
absence of religious freedom.
We can add the Save our State debacle in the state of Oklahoma,
singling out the Sharia law for a special ban to the list of examples
discussed. And we can even revisit the legality of ritual male
341. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism
Lifts the Veil: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
743, 746 (2006) (saying that the bans in this area were meant to target the Islamic
appearance in public qua Islamic for a disfavored treatment).
342. Cf. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the
Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475, 1501 (2018) (arguing that the issued
travel bans effectively incarnate Donald Trump’s promise of issuing a Muslim ban).
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circumcision—although this illustration would ask a much deeper
discussion. On the one hand, we may rely on the non-sectarian
argument that parents should have the autonomy to raise their child in
accordance with their convictions. But does this mean that we should
similarly create exemptions for those types of female circumcision that
are comparable to male circumcision? And does autonomy allow to
irreversibly alter the body of your own child, even if there is no medical
support for that alteration? That is very questionable—but our brief
analysis is large enough to conclude that facially neutral arguments do
not cleanse legislative steps from obvious animus towards religion.
Furthermore, our brief analysis has shown us what we could have
done in all these cases in absence of religious freedom. In other words,
do we lose anything if we would delete religious freedom from the
constitution? Apart from the pragmatic arguments we have provided at
the beginning of this section, we contend that we do not lose anything.
The paradigm of liberal political philosophy contains enough
arguments to oppose any mistreatment of religious people qua
religious. Hence, the abstraction knife cuts on two sides: it is a helpful
strategy to repackage and undo religious practices from their religious
dimension, but it is never as such a justificatory strategy for obvious
discrimination, religious intolerance, and spread of hatred toward
unpopular religious groups or religions.
CONCLUSION
This article has reflected on the reconciliation of diversity with
majoritarian sensitivities as present in the Travel Ban of President
Trump, the Save our State initiative from Oklahoma, and the religious
freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The
European Court of Human Rights has “notoriously been lenient toward
practices of Christian establishment and overtly intolerant toward the
presence of Islam in the public sphere.” 343 Reconciliation of diversity
questions with majoritarian sensitives effectively reinforces
majoritarianism and advances a political agenda that is not tolerant of
the practices of religious minorities. This development violates the
advocated egalitarian understanding of religious freedom. To face the
challenge at this point, this article has developed two novel pragmatic
343.

LABORDE, supra note 39, at 33.
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arguments in favor of religious freedom. These arguments are not
principled in nature. However, for the time being, they provide very
strong arguments to reflect critically upon the internal and external
implications of a potential ban on extant religious manifestations of
religious minorities. This is a temporary defense of religious freedom
rooted in grounds that are non-sectarian, non-majoritarian, and nonviolent to the advocated egalitarian conception of religious freedom. In
addition to the development of this pragmatic framework this article has
set out why even in absence of the right to religious freedom, religious
people and their practices warrant protection, that is because these cases
involve matters of conscience, association, and expression. 344
The dichotomous relationship of liberal political philosophy with
religion does not support a disfavored treatment of either singling
people or their religion out for special prohibitions and restrictions.
Ultimately, this helps us “hold the coordinate branches to account when
they defy our most sacred legal commitments.” 345

344.
345.

Cf. LEITER, supra note 56, at 64.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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